# 1AC --- Platform Utilities

## 1AC --- Platforms --- v1

### 1AC --- Advantage --- China

#### Advantage one is China:

#### Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the only credible threat China will pose to U.S primacy --- The ability of the U.S to leverage private innovation is key

Stephen, 21 (Capt Stephen, Captain Fuller’s (MS, Tarleton State University; BS, University of Phoenix. He is an ANG Cyber Operations Officer serving as the Director of Operations of the Base Communications Flight at Will Rogers, ANGB., 3-12-2021, accessed on 8-31-2021, Air University (AU), "China in Search of AI Supremacy", https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2532254/china-in-search-of-ai-supremacy/)//Babcii

In order to totally understand the need of the United States to maintain and compete for artificial intelligence (AI) supremacy over our near peer threat, China, we must first look at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) militarily goals and what makes them unique in their pursuit. According to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2000’s Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) **ground, air, and naval forces** were sizable but **mostly obsolete**. Their **cyber capabilities were rudimentary**, and its use of information technology was well behind the curve.1 China’s defense industry was **struggling to produce high-quality systems**. Flash forward two decades and the PLA’s objective is to become a “world-class military” by the end of 2049; this per the DOD’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2020. How does a country once floundering by the wayside with obsolete weaponry and technology make such dramatic leaps to be able to announce their intentions of becoming a “world-class” military by the end of 2049? In just a short 20 years, the Chinese are already surpassing us, the mightiest military in the world, in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems. Alongside conventional warfare, the CCP is investing heavily in technology innovations and has specifically mentioned **AI** as a **paramount part of their National Defense Strategy**. Why is AI so important? What is AI? AI can be thought of as the ability of an artificial agent to achieve goals in a “wide range of environments.”2 What China is interested in is more in line with the deep learning aspect of AI. Deep learning, now popularly associated with artificial intelligence, is a technique that harnesses neural networks to train algorithms to do specified tasks, such as image recognition.3 With this deep learning, there are many military applications such as automating military equipment to perform a task(s) while learning better strategies to simply taking more and more of the human element out while the AI makes decisions based on the algorithms that are input into the system(s). While focusing on how it will benefit China economically and socially, they will also be utilizing technology, specifically AI to improve their military efforts; no real line between them in the Chinese construct. Although China is not yet up to par with the rest of the—primarily Western—world, they are putting significant capital in its progress. A perfect example of how serious China is in investing in AI is the AI startup SenseTime. In a four-year span, it went from an academic project to becoming the world’s most valuable artificial intelligence company with a current valuation of $4.5 billion. SenseTime is now the largest algorithm provider in China, as well as the fifth largest AI platform. Along with other tech titans, SenseTime is working with the Chinese government on Made in China 2025, an initiative to make the country economically autonomous.4 Made in China 2025 states the strategic goals of turning China to a major manufacturing power. By 2020, their goal was to consolidate manufacturing power and increase manufacturing digitalization. By 2035, Chinese manufacturing will reach an intermediate level among manufacturing powers. By 2049, China’s manufacturing sector status will become more consolidated, and China will become the leader among the world’s manufacturing powers.5 In order to accomplish this, the Chinese are relying on technology innovations from AI companies such as SenseTime. This brings us to the why and how China is able to rely on civilian innovation as much as it does for not only the social and economic benefits but also the direct alignment of military goals. ”Military-Civil Fusion, or MCF, is an aggressive, national strategy of the CCP. Its goal is to enable the PRC to develop the most technologically advanced military in the world… Under MCF, the CCP is systematically reorganizing the Chinese science and technology enterprise to ensure that new innovations simultaneously advance economic and military development.”6 As a national strategy, military-civil fusion traces roots to the Maoist idea of “people’s warfare,” which prescribed a “whole-of-society” approach to military mobilization, and builds on industrial policy to drive military modernization.7 While civilian companies, such as SenseTime and Ali-Baba, are working to improve the social and economic functions of China; they are also directly in line with the CCP to improve the innovations and the capabilities of the PLA. Unlike the United States, there is no clear line or delineation between the government and its civilian counterparts. The partnership goes both ways; not only do the civilian entities in China share technology and AI algorithms with the government but the CCP ensures that there is plenty of capital invested in the civilian sector, primarily to the companies and entities that have a direct role in achieving the ambitious plans of the CCP. When searching for MCF, the number one topic that comes up time and time again is that of AI. Chinese firms and research institutes are advancing uses of AI that could undermine US **economic leadership and provide an asymmetrical advantage in warfare**. Chinese military strategists see AI as a breakout technology that could enable China to rapidly modernize its military, surpassing overall US capabilities and developing tactics that specifically target US vulnerabilities.8 The CCP is rapidly growing its arsenal, whether it be conventional warfare items or aggressively investing in technology and innovations. Although the PRC does not have the technology and the assets, the engineers, or the capabilities that we have right now, they are **pumping all the resources they can** to ensure that they reach their end state of being a player that everyone has to recognize on an equal playing field. What can a country such as the United States do when we have moral obligations that the CCP does not have, nor institutes? Having a gray area between the civilian sector and the military gives them a clear advantage as there is no such thing as a separation of government and the civilian sector. Our government has some leeway in pushing tax dollars towards certain functions that will improve our overall social and economic structure but crossing the line of government versus private sector is still a clear boundary that most will not cross. We have a democracy as to where our government can change greatly every two to four years, whereas the Chinese have a government that is setup to exist generationally and even past that. Our greatest asset of Democracy might also be the reason that the CCP and the PLA can gain on us in the future, possibly. **The greatest advantage that the United States has over China is our free market system.** **We enable companies to compete** for monetary advantage and with only little government interference/oversight unlike China, which consistently monitors all businesses and citizens. In 2019, privately held AI companies attracted nearly $40 billion in disclosed equity investment—defined as venture capital, private equity, and mergers and acquisitions—across more than 3,100 discrete transactions. US companies attracted most of this investment: $25.2 billion in disclosed value (64 percent of the global total) across 1,412 transactions.9 What does this tell us? Well, China has not attracted the investment that most think; if $25.2 billion or 64 percent of the global total is still coming from the United States, then maybe the competition is not as close as most think it is. Our military depends greatly on our private companies coming up with usable applications for civilian purposes and then the military legally purchases or contracts the item for military use. We do not stifle civilian innovation; we tend to reuse the items in different manners but depend on that civilian innovation for the next greatest thing in technology. Nothing is owed to the United States government and the civilian companies can negotiate the value of their AI product. Although China is focusing more internally on their own startups, their AI narrative, and it seems to not be at the level that our AI innovation is, we must continue to proceed with caution. As soon as we let down our guard, China may surpass us and could possibly one day become the world’s AI leader.

#### Two Internal links ---

#### First---Innovation---Unrestrained platforms create kill zones that destroy startups and venture capital

Kamepalli et al., 20 (Sai Kamepalli, Luigi Zingales, and Raghuram Rajan, Kamepalli: Columbia University Department of Economics, Zingales: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Rajan: Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, May 2020, accessed on 8-20-2021, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, "Kill Zone", https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\_papers/w27146/w27146.pdf)//Babcii

There is a growing worry that digital **platforms** (multi-sided markets that offer digital services to customers, often for free) might be gaining market power, distorting competition, and **slowing innovation**. A specific concern is that such platforms might acquire any potential competitors, dissuading others from entering, and thus preventing innovation from serving as the competitive threat that is traditionally believed to keep monopoly incumbents on their toes. In a sense, such platforms create **a “kill zone” around their areas of activity**. This is not just a theoretical possibility. For instance, Albert Wenger, a managing partner at Union Square Ventures and an early investor in Twitter recently declared the “Kill Zone is a real thing. The scale of these companies [digital platforms] and their impact on what can be funded, and what can succeed, is massive.”1 The notion that platform acquisitions discourage new investments is at odds with a standard argument in economics (see Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), and for related evidence); if incumbents pay handsomely to acquire new entrants, why should entry be curtailed? Why would the prospect of an acquisition not be an extra incentive for entrepreneurs to enter the space, in the hope of being acquired at hefty multiples? We first check if there is more than anecdotal evidence of a “Kill Zone”, sufficient to warrant a theoretical analysis. Figure 1 shows that the number and **the dollar value of new start-ups** in the social media space **have dropped dramatically** in the last few years. This could, of course, be consistent with a number of explanations. To probe deeper, we conjecture that when a major acquisition by an incumbent platform is not blocked by the antitrust authorities, it signals there is a higher likelihood that other similar acquisitions will not be blocked. Under this assumption, a testable consequence of the existence of a “Kill Zone” is that the acquisition of an important new entrant by an incumbent digital platform can lead to a decrease in new entry and a decrease in the amounts invested in early-stage enterprises that are similar to the entity acquired. To test this, we collect data on the number of deals and dollar amounts invested by venture capitalists in a sector around the time **major acquisitions by Facebook and Google are announced** in that sector (a more detailed explanation of the data sources and the figures discussed in the introduction follow in Section 1). In the three years following an acquisition by Google and Facebook in a certain industry sector, **VC investments in that sector** (normalized by total investments in the software industry) **drop by over 40%** (see Figure 2a) **and the number of deals falls by over 20%** (see Figure 2b). Is this a common phenomenon in all software acquisitions? When we compare VC investments in companies similar to the target after a Google or Facebook acquisition with VC investments in companies similar to the target after an acquisition by any other software company, we find that investments drop more after a Google or Facebook acquisition (see Figures 2a and 2b). Thus, consistent with the idea of a “Kill Zone”, there seems to be something special about acquisitions by multi-sided platforms that deters further investment in that space. We consider alternative explanations of these results, including the possibility that most (if not all) the start-ups similar to the ones acquired by Google or Facebook were created with the only objective of being acquired by Google or Facebook. Thus, when a tech platform settles on a target, the potential alternatives lose their likely buyer and thus financing. To address this concern, we only look at startups that are in a similar space, but not too close to the space of the acquired ones (so that they cannot be considered perfect substitutes). Our results are qualitatively similar. After a number of other robustness checks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of the existence of a kill zone. We therefore turn to a possible theoretical explanation. We argue that the standard economic argument (of acquisitions incentivizing entry) relies critically on the acquisition price for firms being adequate compensation for innovation. This may not hold in the context of acquisitions by digital platforms, because the economics of digital platforms differs significantly from the textbook neoclassical economics of firms. To show this, we build a simple model of platform competition that contains the key novel ingredients present in this space: First, platforms are multi-sided. On one side, the platform serves customers who are not charged any explicit fee for services. On the other side, it deals with advertisers, who pay for access to customers. As a result, there isn’t any price competition on the customer side. Second, there are important network externalities on the customer side of the market. Third, customers start out with the incumbent (an immense incumbency advantage in the presence of network externalities). Finally, some agents have switching costs. In this context, we show that a crucial role in the success of an entrant offering platform services is played by early adopting app designers (we will suggest alternative types of early adopters later). Each app designer has a cost of adapting their app to the new platform, a switching cost that will be recovered only if the platform is above a certain quality. If the cost of adopting the new platform varies across app designers, it is straightforward that the higher the quality of the entrant, the more the number of app designers who will adopt it. The mass of adopting app designers, in turn, drives the adoption by ordinary customers for two reasons. First, the mass of adopting designers offers a signal about the fundamental quality improvement brought about by the new platform. Second, this mass creates a network externality for ordinary customers, who have to choose whether to adopt the new platform – clearly, the more the apps on the entrant platform, the higher its utility to the ordinary customer. The adoption decision by the app designer is crucial. Importantly, it is greatly affected by the ease with which acquisitions are cleared by the Federal Trade Commission. If an app designer expects the new platform to be acquired soon, they will be reluctant to pay the adaptation costs, unless the new platform is of significantly higher quality than the incumbent one. After all, they know that if the entering platform’s technology is a net improvement over the existing technology, the incumbent will integrate it smoothly with the existing platform, with new features melded with old features so that existing apps work seamlessly without any additional costs. Thus, the **expectation of a merger soon after entry will dissuade** many **designers** from incurring the additional cost to adapt their apps to the entrant platform. **In turn**, the low number of apps on the entrant will **deter many ordinary customers from adopting it**. The stand-alone market value of the entrant platform represents the entrant’s reservation value in any bilateral merger negotiation with the incumbent. It will be critical in determining the acquisition price. Since value in the multi-sided platform comes from advertisers, who will pay for the customers they can access, the entrant’s stand-alone value will be driven by the total number of customers who adopt it. Yet, this number depends crucially on the number of app designers who adopt it, which in turn depends on the expectation this platform would indeed stand alone. Thus the prospect of a quick acquisition can sufficiently reduce adoption by designers, and hence by customers, so as to reduce the payoff from the merger and discourage entry. Put differently, think of early-adopter designers as bees: in pursuing their own interest they generate a positive externality. Because of this externality, any environmental condition that affects bees’ incentives to roam across flowers has a much bigger effect than its direct effect on bees’ welfare. The same is true here. Any environmental condition that reduces the app designers’ incentives to switch to better platforms has a negative effect on the system. If it is so important for an entrant to signal that it will not sell out to the incumbent, why doesn’t it commit to it? An entrant entrepreneur will try her best to portray fierce independence, committing to uphold the “purity” of her new technology. In fact, the often-claimed presence of super egoistic CEOs/founders, driven more by a vision than by money, can be interpreted as their attempt to commit credibly to never sell the platform. So can the prevalence of the dual class share structure that entrusts the founders with ultimate control. Nevertheless, in a world of rational agents, **it is hard to see how the entrepreneur can credibly commit not to sell** when selling maximizes her profits (given that a monopolist’s profits are greater than the sum of the profits of two duopolists).

#### That creates a build for sale market that undermines primacy

Foster, 20 (Dakota Foster, a graduate student at Oxford and a former Visiting Researcher at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology., 6-2-2020, accessed on 5-21-2021, Brookings, "Antitrust investigations have deep implications for AI and national security", https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/antitrust-investigations-have-deep-implications-for-ai-and-national-security/) //Babcii

Changes to the composition of America’s tech sector might boost net AI innovation. From 2013-2018, [**90 percent**](http://uchicagogate.com/articles/2019/10/20/its-time-break-big-tech/)**of** successful Silicon Valley **AI start-ups were purchased** by leading tech companies. This is a potentially worrisome trend for AI innovation. After all, incumbent firms and emerging companies can have **very different incentives**. Entrenched tech **giants** may be **more focused on maintaining market share than disrupting** markets altogether. As Big Tech [increasingly moves to acquire](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/big-tech-swallows-most-of-the-hot-ai-startups) AI start-ups, individual firm dynamics also shift. Instead of [“building for scale,” start-ups begin to “**build for sale**,”](https://www.economist.com/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-startups) adopting a mentality that may be **ill-suited for moonshot innovations**. Would a company like DeepMind (now owned by Google parent-company Alphabet), for example, have developed AlphaGo—the ground-breaking computer program that became the first to beat a human player in Go—if the firm’s primary goal was to be acquired by a bigger player? Antitrust action could shift these incentives and spur competition, potentially opening the door for new AI innovations—and for a new wave of AI companies. With their smaller statures, some of these firms might focus on more niche AI applications, including defense-related products, as start-ups like Anduril and ShieldAI have done. Today’s tech giants have every financial incentive to cater to foreign markets and the average consumer, not to the U.S. federal government. Indeed, with its global user-base, it is hard to imagine Google tailoring its AI innovation decisions to U.S. defense needs. The same may not hold within an AI ecosystem where some companies built, for example, in the mold of Palantir (a data-analytics company with clear national-security applications) consider government their primary customer and subsequently concentrate on its demands. **National-security** agencies, from the Pentagon to the U.S. intelligence community, **could stand to benefit from** more **targeted innovation**—and from an industrial base better attuned to their needs. As Christian Brose [points out](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-end-of-americas-era-of-military-primacy-11590155833), only a fraction of the U.S.’s billion-dollar tech “unicorns” have operated in the defense sector, leaving the U.S. military “shockingly behind the commercial world in many critical technologies.

#### It also undermines capability to deploy new technology

Lemley and McCreary, 19 (Mark Lemley and Andrew McCreary, Lemley: Stanford Law School, McCreary: Stanford University, Graduate School of Business; Stanford Law School, 12-19-2019, accessed on 8-20-2021, Papers.ssrn, "Exit Strategy", <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506919>)//Babcii

While these may be valid points in particular cases, they do not disprove nor help solve the problems of concentration caused by the norm of selling startups to incumbents. First, market structure matters. Markets that are not competitive not only distort prices but reduce innovation. 235 Further, incumbent **acquisitions prevent** potential **competitors from** combining to form a company that can credibly threaten **entry at scale**. 236 So reducing the possibility of Schumpeterian competition is likely to discourage innovation in the long run. And precisely because incumbency does bring some real advantages, we may need to create incentives to support Schumpeterian competition and avoid perpetual incumbency. In any event, the incumbent will put the innovation in the hands of more consumers **only if it actually deploys that product**. As we have seen, **incumbents often buy startups and then kill them**, either deliberately or by dissipating the team and not focusing on the acquired product.237 Incumbents have **less incentive to deploy** new technologies than startups do. That’s because incumbents who replace their existing product with a new one are mostly stealing customers from themselves.238 And **incumbents don’t need to innovate** to stay alive if they can buy any entrant that looks like a threat.239

#### Regardless of startups --- Concentration alone undermines the DIB by creating a symbiotic relationship

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

Big Tech and the Defense Industrial Base **Concentration** in the tech sector also **threatens the defense industrial base** due to higher costs, lower quality, less innovation, and even corruption and fraud.71 Each of these dynamics has already been a problem for America’s over-consolidated defense industrial base. As technology becomes more and more central to defense and national security, it is likely that these same dynamics will replicate themselves with big tech companies. This will become a national security threat, both directly, in terms of the quality and speed of procurement, and indirectly, by reducing innovation and functionally redirecting defense budgets from research spending to higher monopoly profits.72Conventional economic theory suggests that monopolists have the ability to increase prices and reduce quality because consumers are captive.73 When it comes to defense spending, the Government Accountability Office commented in 2019 that “competition is the cornerstone of a sound acquisition process and a critical tool for achieving the best return on investment for taxpayers.”74 At the same time, the GAO observed that “portfolio-wide cost growth has occurred in an environment where awards are often made without full and open competition.”75 Indeed, it found that 67 percent of 183 major weapons systems contracts had no competition and almost half of contracts went to a handful of firms. Of course, consolidation also means that the **Defense Department is in a symbiotic relationship** with these big contractors. Some startup executives wanting to sell to the government thus see the Pentagon as “**a bad customer**, one that is heavily skewed in favor of larger, traditional players,” and they don’t feel like they can break into the sector.76 Standard stories about political economy and capture also suggest that these firms will have outsized power over government.77 As Frank Kendall, the former head of acquisitions at the Pentagon, has said, “With size comes power, and the department’s experience with large defense contractors is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage.”78 In the defense context, that means monopolists retain power (and profits), even if they overcharge taxpayers and risk the safety of military personnel in the field. In an important article in The American Conservative on concentration in the defense sector, researchers Matt Stoller and Lucas Kunce argue that contractors with de facto monopoly at the heart of their business models threaten national security. They write that one such contractor, TransDigm, buys up companies that supply the government with rare but essential airline parts and then hike up the prices, effectively holding the government “hostage.”79 They also point to L3, a defense contractor that had ambitions to be a “Home Depot” for the Pentagon, as its former CEO put it. L3’s de facto monopoly over certain products, according to Stoller and Kunce, means that it continues to receive lucrative government contracts, even after admitting in 2015 that it knowingly supplied defective weapons sights to U.S. forces.80 Consolidation also threatens U.S. defense capacity. The decline of competition, according to a 2019 Pentagon report, leaves the military vulnerable to “sole source suppliers, capacity shortfalls, a lack of competition, a lack of workforce skills, and unstable demand.”81 With a **limited number of producers, there is less talent and knowhow** available in the country if there is a need **to build capacity rapidly**.82 In 2018, the Defense Department released a report on vulnerable items in the military supply chain, including numerous items in which only one or two domestic companies (and, in some cases, zero domestic companies) produced the essential goods.83 How did the United States lose so much of its industrial base? The combination of consolidation and global integration is part of the story. As Stoller and Kunce argue, companies consolidated in the 1980s and 1990s while shifting emphasis from production and R&D to Wall Street-demanded profits. Globalization then allowed them to shift production overseas at a lower cost. The result was to gut America’s domestic industrial base—and, in many cases, to shift it to China, which engaged in a decades-long strategic plan to develop its own industrial base. The result, in the words of the 2018 Defense Department report, is that “China is the single or sole supplier for a number of specialty chemicals used in munitions and missiles.” In other areas too, the risks of losing access to critical resources are real. Describing the problem of limited carbon fiber sources, the same Pentagon report notes, “[a] sudden and catastrophic loss of supply would disrupt DoD missile, satellite, space launch, and other defense manufacturing programs. In many cases, **there are no substitutes readily available**.”84 As technology becomes more integral to the future of national security, it is hard to see how big tech will not simply go the way of the big defense contractors. Corporate mottos not to “be evil” are long gone,85 and big tech companies spend millions on conventional Washington, D.C., lobbying efforts.86 Over time, as contracts move to tech behemoths, there will no longer be competitive alternatives, and the Pentagon will likely be locked into relationships with big tech companies—just as they currently are with big defense contractors.87 Some commentators suggest that robust antitrust policies are a problem because only a small number of tech companies can contract for defense projects.88 But there is another way to look at it: **The goal should be to encourage competition in the tech sector so that there are multiple contractors available**. As former secretary of homeland security Michael Chertoff has said, defending the antitrust case against Qualcomm, “a single-source national champion creates an unacceptable risk to American security—artificially concentrating vulnerability in a single point. ... We need competition and multiple providers, not a potentially vulnerable technological monoculture.”89 The consequence of consolidation in tech is that taxpayers will likely see higher bills even as innovation slows due to reduced competition. Worse still, **every taxpayer dollar that goes to monopoly profits**—whether in the form of higher prices or fraud and corruption—**is a dollar that is not going toward innovation** for the future. A concentrated defense sector means not only less innovation due to the lack of competition in the sector; it means that funding that could have been available for innovation instead gets redirected via monopoly profits to the pockets of big tech executives and shareholders.

#### Specifically true of AI --- Platform research falls prey to priority divergence

Konkel, 21 (Citing study by CSET, policy research organization within Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Frank Konkel, Nextgov’s executive editor. He writes about the intersection of government and technology. B.S in journalism from Michigan State, 4-23-2021, accessed on 8-6-2021, Nextgov.com, "Study Shines a Light on Big Tech’s AI Investments", <https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2021/04/study-shines-light-big-techs-ai-investments/173561/)//Babcii>

A study released this week indicates leading private sector tech companies’ investments in artificial intelligence may **not ensure “long-term** national **competitiveness**” within the United States. Conducted by the [**Center for Security and Emerging Technology**](https://cset.georgetown.edu/research/mapping-research-agendas-in-u-s-corporate-ai-laboratories/?utm_source=Center+for+Security+and+Emerging+Technology&utm_campaign=0c2bdea508-Mapping+Research+Agendas+in+U.S.+Corporate+AI&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fcbacf8c3e-0c2bdea508-438303754), the study maps the research agendas of **Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Google,** IBM and Microsoft across 60 AI areas, including robotics and grasping to optimization. The study **indicates “consideration differentiation”** in prioritized AI research areas among the companies that could negatively impact the United States’ status against near-peer **nation-state rivals**. “None of the leading companies examined in this analysis appear to be **prioritizing work on problem areas** within machine learning **that will offset the broader structural challenges** the United States faces in deploying and benefitting from the technology when **competing against authoritarian regimes,”** the study states. The study indicates problem areas include federated learning, simulation learning, interpretability, few-shot learning and machine learning fairness—all subfields of AI. The study’s findings are based on numerous research papers published by universities since 2010 and other open-source information, according to its authors. The study encourages U.S. policymakers to “take into account the state of play of corporate investments’ in AI in formulating national AI policy, and suggests the U.S. government position itself as “gap filler” by addressing certain machine learning areas . “To the extent that national interests and private sector agendas converge, the U.S. government may only need to encourage existing research activity,” the study states. “To the extent that these interests diverge, U.S. government strategy may **need to intervene more extensively in order to ensure national competitiveness** in underinvested areas.”

#### Ending platforms solves --- Empirics prove

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

Big Tech, Competitiveness, and Innovation One of the central arguments against breaking up and regulating big tech on national security grounds is that big tech companies are essential for innovation in the tech sector and thus for American competitiveness and ultimately for national security. Historically, however, **innovation has come from** a mix of **competition** and public funding of research and development. Breaking up and regulating tech companies thus doesn’t mean ceding ground to the Chinese on technological innovation—it means creating a competitive marketplace with great innovative capacity. Whether or not they say it explicitly, those who want to protect big tech from antitrust and regulation support a national champions model. The national champions approach suggests that innovation takes place within big companies that are protected from competition and therefore have resources to spend on research and development. Some associate this approach with Joseph Schumpeter, who suggested that firms in competitive markets might be less innovative than monopolists.58 In this vein, commentators celebrate how Bell Labs was able to innovate for generations and see Google X, Facebook, and other tech companies as similarly investing in frontier research that will ultimately lead to innovative breakthroughs.59 While innovation can take place under a national champions model, innovation does not require national champions—and there are strong arguments that the **national champions approach is** limited and even **counterproductive**. First, as Tim Wu has noted, “[B]oth history and basic economics suggest we do much better trusting that fierce competition at home yields stronger industries overall.”60 This response, of course, has been commonplace in basic economics for decades and in debates on competition is linked to the views of Kenneth Arrow.61 Market competition is good for innovation because competitors have to find ways to differentiate themselves in order to survive and expand. In contrast, large protected firms get lethargic, are slow to innovate, and rest on their laurels Wu points out that we also have evidence—not just theory—to show that protecting national champions is inferior to encouraging competition. In the 1980s, Wu argues, **Japan took** the approach of protecting its **national champions** in the electronics industry. Powerhouses like NEC, Panasonic, and Toshiba had direct government support. In contrast, **the United States took the opposite** tack with IBM. The computer firm was brought under antitrust scrutiny, and the legal battle went on for more than a decade, along the way chilling Big Blue from engaging in any conduct that could even potentially run afoul of the antitrust laws. **The result**, Wu notes, **was** to create the space for a variety of hardware and software companies, **Microsoft, Lotus, and Apple** among them. **Competition led to innovation** and the creation of some of the most forward-looking companies of the era.62 Second, national champions can actually limit innovation because they have an incentive to avoid research and innovations that might jeopardize their business model or undermine their dominant position. Bell Labs, for example, has long been celebrated for its role as an “ideas factory.”63 But **Bell and AT&T** also **suppressed innovations** when they threatened its business model. Bell inventors, for example, developed recording devices in the 1930s that could have been used for answering machines. But AT&T’s management blocked their emergence for fear that they would jeopardize use of the telephone.64 An alternative approach to innovation is one that relies less on protectionism for national champions and more on market competition and on public investment in research and innovation. Competition, as noted already, can be a powerful motivator for innovation. When big tech incumbents face little competition, society forgoes the innovation benefits that come from competition. Who knows if Instagram or WhatsApp could have dethroned Facebook’s primacy and developed even more new and innovative products? Facebook’s moves to acquire those firms prevented us from ever finding out. What small businesses might emerge if they didn’t have to compete with Amazon Basics on Amazon’s Marketplace? **Unwinding mergers and separating platforms from companies that do business on the platform would help** spur competition and **lead to** innovation. Some might argue that **robotics, AI, and quantum computing** are so resource-intensive that an ecosystem of smaller companies engaged in fierce competition would mean that no company would have the resources available to invest in those next-generation technologies. There are a few responses to this argument. First, it is not clear that breaking up and regulating big tech would prevent those firms from having the considerable resources to develop the technologies of the future. Facebook would still have billions of users, even without Instagram and WhatsApp, for example. Amazon’s platform would still have enormous market power.

#### Second---Integration---Platforms are integrating with China which undermines competition

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

The claim that big American tech companies are somehow an alternative to Chinese dominance—or, in the more extreme form, that they are competing with China on behalf of the United States—**is largely backwards**. In fact, many **big American tech companies are operating in China, working with Chinese companies, and seeking to expand**. Because markets and the state are intertwined in China, interactions with Chinese companies and investments in China are likely to pass along operational and technological **developments** to the Chinese government and military, including in ways that advance its emerging surveillance state—and **accelerate its ability** to spread its model of digital authoritarianism around the world. In short, big tech companies that operate in China are likely assisting the rise of China, not acting as a hedge against it. Rather than competing with China, many big tech companies are integrating with China or attempting to deepen their integration with China. **Google has announced an AI center in Beijing**,8 and it is exploring a partnership with Tencent that involves using the Chinese tech giant’s cloud service as an alternative to Google Cloud.9 In 2018, the company also proposed Project Dragonfly, which would have created a search engine that would be in compliance with Chinese censorship regulations behind the Great Firewall.10 That endeavor created controversy within the firm and criticism from human rights groups.11 Other companies also operate in China or are seeking to do so. **Microsoft is expanding data centers in China** and has built an operating system, “Windows 10 China Government Edition,” for the Chinese government.12 After Alibaba, **Amazon provides the largest cloud service in China**, and its Amazon Web Services division works with local companies and is expanding its data centers.13 **Apple, of course, famously designs its phones in California but makes them in China**.14 In 2017, Apple announced a partnership with a Chinese firm with close ties to the government and a year later moved its Chinese iCloud and iCloud encryption services to China.15 Notably, **Facebook** isn’t operating in China—but not for lack of trying. The company has **repeatedly attempted to gain access** but has been blocked by government officials.16 Merely operating in China might not seem like it undermines the claim of U.S.-Chinese competition. After all, it might be that American companies are seeking to steal market share from Chinese companies in China. Global dominance requires, unsurprisingly, dominance around the globe, including in the world’s biggest markets. The problem is that, according to scholars, U.S. government officials, and even American business associations, any U.S. company that is developing AI in China, making significant technological investments in China, or simply operating in China is likely supporting the Chinese government and military. Chinese companies are often state-run, partly owned by the state, or have informal ties to state and Communist Party officials, as scholars have documented.17 Formal and informal ties allow the government to have influence over many companies, and they create an incentive for companies to comply with party preferences preemptively even without formal government pressure.18 Cooperation and partnerships with these companies therefore mean cooperation with state-directed aims. “No major Chinese company,” Senator Mark Warner has noted, “is independent of the Chinese government and Communist Party.”19 An official at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce goes even further, arguing that American firms going to China have “to please the Chinese government and the Communist Party.”20 Moreover, because artificial intelligence is a dual-use technology, ostensibly commercial innovations can also have military implications. China’s stated doctrine of “civil-military fusion” thus virtually guarantees that companies are indirectly assisting the military if they are working with Chinese entities.21 Under that doctrine, “any technologies held by the private or academic sectors—whether imported or developed in-house—must be shared with the Chinese military.”22 When combined with the corporate-state relationship in China, this means the technological innovations in the private sector are likely being shared with the government for military purposes. As former defense secretary Ash Carter has noted, “If you’re working in China, you don’t know whether you’re working on a project for the military or not.”23 The fact that Chinese companies and the state are intertwined means that American companies working in China are potentially helping accelerate the adoption of digital authoritarianism within China and its spread abroad. In general, the development of artificial intelligence “offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them.”24 Big data, combined with AI, enables governments and big tech companies not only to predict but also to shape what individuals will do. Politically, this means that governments will have the power to preempt dissenters to a far greater degree than authoritarian regimes of the past.25 Economically, it means that centralized economic planning might find greater success than in the past, because governments and companies can shape the behavior of individuals.26 And over time, behavioral changes shape beliefs, potentially building support for the regime itself.27 These dynamics suggest that the new “digital authoritarianism” may have greater staying power than its low-tech precursors.28 At home, China has long been concerned about domestic disharmony and has pursued a policy of “social management” to achieve “holistic” security—not just national security but party organization and the management of the social order.29 The Chinese State Council sees AI as “irreplaceable” in ensuring social harmony in the future.30 China has taken steps to develop a “social credit system,” in which individuals are assessed in every interaction to determine their trustworthiness, their compliance with laws and social norms, and the degree to which their social networks are also compliant. Chinese tech companies have reportedly agreed to share data with the government in support of this project.31 Local governments and tech companies are cooperating to develop “credit cities,” the local counterpart to a full-on national system.32 Chinese companies are also already exporting surveillance technologies abroad, including biometric censors and facial recognition software.33 Given that many big American tech companies are operating in China or seeking to do so and that engagement with Chinese entities likely means information is transferred to the government, the idea that big American tech companies are helping the United States vis-à-vis China in some kind of Cold War-style technology arms race makes little sense. It is just as likely, if not much more so, that **firms operating in China are directly** or indirectly **furthering China’s emergent** domestic surveillance capabilities, its **military** use of those technologies, and its spread of digital authoritarianism abroad as well.34

#### That cements a Chinese advantage through espionage, surveillance, and government capture

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

In addition to benefiting Chinese power, big tech’s integration with China threatens the United States by creating leverage over the United States, and it could, in the future, undermine the American ecosystem of free speech and expression. This could happen in multiple ways: **Integration opens the United States to espionage and surveillance**, creates economic leverage over the United States, and preemptively forces companies to adhere to the standards of Chinese censors, thereby restricting speech and expression particularly on issues related to democracy. Most obviously, integration with China raises concerns about espionage and surveillance. For example, Pentagon officials have been concerned that if the Chinese company Huawei operates 5G systems among American allies, the United States will have to restrict intelligence sharing along such systems; if those systems have surveillance capacities or backdoors, information across the system could be captured by the Chinese government.35 Federal regulators have also flagged a Chinese company’s acquisition of the dating app Grindr, which has a great deal of personal information that could be used to pressure or blackmail users.36 More broadly, economic interdependence can be used as leverage for political purposes. Scholars refer to this by a variety of terms, including “geoeconomics,”37 “reverse entanglement,”38 and “weaponized interdependence.”39 But the tactics are similar regardless of the label— and China utilizes them frequently. To retaliate against South Korea’s adoption of a U.S. missile defense system, China blocked tourism to the country.40 And it blocked imports from Norway after dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.41 Interdependence in the economy generally, and in the technology sector specifically, thus bring significant risks to the United States in an era of great power competition. The more integrated the economies of two countries, the more likely it is that a foreign country will have **leverage over the United States**. The use of boycotts is one example. But raising tariffs to start a trade war could devastate sectors of the economy, and interrupting a supply chain for essential parts and components (whether consumer, commercial, or military) could have significant consequences, particularly in a crisis. Integration also means that **corporations are contorting their operations** outside of China in order **to comply** with the preferences of Chinese censors. The most prominent concern is self-censorship—companies and other actors that change their messages, artistic choices, or statements for fear of offending Chinese censors. For example, the general manager of the Houston Rockets basketball team tweeted support for the Hong Kong protestors, only to backtrack in the face of concerns about the Chinese reaction.42 The People’s Daily branded Mercedes-Benz an “enemy of the people” after the car manufacturer posted a quote from the Dalai Lama on Instagram; Mercedes later deleted the post.43 Some university researchers are concerned about self-censorship within academia on topics related to China.44 Hollywood studios are reportedly changing dialogue, scenes, and themes in movies in order to comply with Chinese censors.45 And tech companies too have taken steps toward compliance with Chinese internet regulations: Apple, for example, “removed VPNs [virtual private networks] from the Chinese version of its App Store.”46 Google’s Project Dragonfly was controversial internally with employees for the same reason. Why does it matter if corporations change their behaviors based on Chinese preferences? After all, global companies have done so for many years. McDonald’s and Coca-Cola, for example, offer different menus and beverages in different countries to respond to the tastes and preferences of consumers. The shift in corporate behavior in response to Chinese preferences differs in two ways. First, unlike the McDonald’s and Coca-Cola examples, companies aren’t just changing their products within China. They are doing so globally. That the leaders of Mercedes won’t quote the Dalai Lama and Hollywood writers are changing scripts for blockbuster films because they might offend Chinese censors means that American audiences are subject to the views of Chinese censors, as is the rest of the world. Second, the willingness of these companies to adhere to Chinese preferences calls into question whether global firms can be trusted when they seek to lobby or influence the U.S. government. In the mid-twentieth century, the maxim “what’s good for General Motors is good for America” suggested a link between corporate success and national success. That is unlikely to be the case anymore (if it ever was). Under the dominant ideology of contemporary corporate lawyers—who see shareholder profits as the sole aim of corporate managers—corporate managers are required to pursue profitable operations; American national interests are not part of the calculus.47 A global corporation that gains most of its profits from abroad might therefore have profit-based interests that do not align with American national interests. To put a fine point on it, one could imagine a company that seeks to expand its access into China lobbying the United States government in ways that are detrimental to American interests and, indeed, even serve the interests of the Chinese government. This is not to say that corporate executives or lobbyists are foreign agents deliberately pursuing such an aim—or that they think of themselves that way and would state as much to government officials. This wolf comes in sheep’s clothing: Policies will likely be justified as pursuing neutral economic principles, and many who advocate for them might not even see the broader connections. Defenders of integration often suggest that narrowly drawn regulations can address any problems that might arise from integration, though at least some defenders consider even limited restrictions on economic integration to be disastrous.48 For example, one set of think tank scholars have argued for requiring transparency in Chinese corporation ownership (that is, to identify state-owned or -invested companies) as a way to prevent Chinese influence over American corporations. 49 Another set says that U.S. policy should consider “who owns a company’s stock, how the company is governed, and whether it has sizable contracts with the Chinese military or defense industry. ... Similarly, companies with executives close to the state, through either prior employers or personal connections, warrant further scrutiny.”50 A third argues that “the United States should work with its allies and trading partners to pressure Beijing to open up the Chinese market to foreign companies, curb its preferential treatment of Chinese firms, and better protect foreign companies’ intellectual property.”51 If it is correct that the Chinese state and market are integrated, as a number of senior defense officials and scholars of the Chinese state and market have argued,52 then these policy solutions **cannot meet the nature of the challenge. Transparency** rules will not solve the **problem of informal ties** between government and private sector in China, nor do they place mandates on companies if there are formal ties. Careful **investigation** of the relevant relationships and ownership ties might **miss important connections**, ignore the fact that Chinese doctrine requires civil-military fusion, and neglect to address the **incentive** companies have **to comply preemptively** with Chinese government preferences, even absent any specific connection to the government or pressure from the government. Finally, efforts to reduce preferential treatment and protect American intellectual property run counter to the fact that the **integration** of state and market in China **is** not a bug, but **a central feature** of the system.

#### Ending platforms ends integration

Sitaraman, 20 (Ganesh Sitaraman , Prof @ Vanderbilt University law school, A.B. in government magna cum laude from Harvard College, a master’s degree in political thought from Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. longtime advisor to Elizabeth Warren, 1-30-2020, accessed on 7-18-2021, Papers.ssrn, "The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech by Ganesh Sitaraman :: SSRN", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3537870)//Babcii

What does bigness have to do with integration? Or to put it differently, is the real problem integration with China rather than a weak antitrust and regulatory regime to govern big tech companies? The question of integration with China as a general matter is beyond the scope of this essay, but the **size and dominance of American tech companies is** part of **the problem**, and breaking up big tech should therefore be part of the solution. To see why, compare a concentrated ecosystem with a small number of big companies to a competitive ecosystem with a large number of small companies. In a concentrated ecosystem with few players, China will have far more leverage over the United States. A small number of big tech companies that are integrated with China will be more dependent on Chinese markets for consumers and profits—and, in turn, more vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese government. In contrast, in **a fractured market with many players, it is much more likely that some will seek other sources** for supply chains, **develop domestic** American capacities, **or** simply **choose not to engage** in the Chinese market—whether because of idiosyncratic preferences, competitive dynamics, product differentiation, higher costs, or other factors. It is theoretically possible that we might instead expect another outcome: A small number of tech firms making monopoly profits might not need Chinese markets and therefore would be more independent from that country’s fusion of politics and economics. Likewise, a multi-player ecosystem of smaller companies, each with razor-thin profit margins, might push all of these players to dependence on Chinese markets for consumers and profits (this is, of course, where debates over integration versus disentanglement are relevant). But theory is not reality, and this alternative hypothesis has not been borne out. In our current highly concentrated tech market, big tech companies are not forsaking Chinese markets out of a combination of morality, patriotism, and monopoly profits. They are operating in China and are desperate to integrate further. Concerns about censorship and distorted practices are also significantly reduced in a competitive ecosystem of smaller players because some companies and creative gatekeepers won’t aim to comply with Chinese government preferences. Consider the Hollywood context. Disney’s share of box office sales domestically, for example, approaches 40 percent, and the six biggest studios have 85 percent of box office sales.53 These companies produce fewer films and, because of their market power, can contractually require that those films be shown in theaters in ways that block other films.54 These companies are also increasingly integrating vertically across production and distribution: Netflix both produces shows and operates a streaming service, as does Amazon and now even Disney. The result is that smaller players are likely to face a tilted playing field because integrated behemoths can prioritize their own content over competitors and might not take chances on content that isn’t likely to maximize their viewership goals.55 If these big integrated companies comply with Chinese censors because of their ambitions in the Chinese market, then American consumers will not see content that doesn’t adhere to Chinese government preferences. In contrast, in a system with a large number of small studios, many would not have the size and scope to play to the Chinese market, let alone be dependent on the Chinese market. They also wouldn’t have the power and scale to preference their own content over competitors through vertical integration. The result would be an ecosystem in which Americans will have a range of content choices—including entertainment that might not accord with the views of foreign censors. Big tech companies are not likely immune from what is happening in Hollywood—as well as what has happened to Mercedes and other entities that seek to operate in China. **Many of these companies**, like Amazon and Google, seek access to Chinese markets and **operate as both content producers and distributors or platforms**. To the extent that they have divisions whose work is objectionable to censors in foreign countries (Amazon, of course, creates its own content; as does YouTube, which is a subsidiary of Google), **they** too **will feel pressure to preemptively shape that content** in ways that are palatable to censors. And because of their market power within the United States, U.S. consumers are likely to be left with fewer and fewer serious scalable alternatives. Finally, in a competitive ecosystem with many players, concerns about the ill effects of lobbying are mitigated as well. In a system with a few dominant players, efforts to lobby the United States government should be seen as highly questionable because of companies’ dependence on Chinese markets. A multi-player ecosystem addresses this challenge in two ways: First, many companies will not be dependent on Chinese markets. Second, in a multi-player ecosystem, **differentiated companies are less likely to have shared interests** and are more likely to end up on different sides of policy questions.56 This means that their lobbying efforts are less likely to cut in a single direction and thus less likely to capture government. **This insight is not** a **new** one—it is foundational to American political and constitutional thought. In Federalist 10, James Madison argued that in a political ecosystem with many groups with differentiated interests, no particular faction would be able to capture government.57 Instead, they would cancel each other out and enable policymakers to pursue the public good. **Competition between interests**, not the dominance of a few interests (particularly if foreign-influenced), **preserves a free and democratic government.**

#### AI development causes quick Chinese military supremacy in every domain

Nouwens, 15 (Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Defence Policy and Military Modernisation, Meia holds a BA Hons in international relations and political science from Macquarie University, a master’s in international relations and diplomacy from Leiden University in conjunction with the Clingendael Institute, and an MPhil in modern Chinese studies from the University of Oxford and Peking University., 10-29-2015, accessed on 8-9-2021, IISS, "China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies", https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/12/emerging-technology-dominance)//Babcii

In the realm of defence, too, AI plays a current and future role. **Beijing aims to** build high-technology weaponry that would enable China to **leapfrog the United States’ currently superior** military **capabilities**, integrating advanced technologies like AI and big data into the PLA. AI will be incorporated into Chinese military technologies across domains, from unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and drone swarms to fire-and-forget modes for China’s varied missile arsenal and cyber-attacks. Importantly, the PLA aims to use AI to support intelligent operations and system-of-systems warfare.61 According to Shen Shoulin and Zhang Guoning, ‘”brain supremacy” (the ability to interfere with or damage the cognition of the enemy) **will replace earlier warfare concepts seeking military dominance over land, sea, air and more recently space and cyber domains’**.62 Once intelligence supremacy is achieved over enemies in the information space, **supremacy over other domains is rendered meaningless**, according to this approach.63 AI will also be imperative to intelligent monitoring and early-warning systems.64

#### That causes nuclear escalation

Kroenig and Gopalaswamy, 18 (Matthew Kroenig and Bharath Gopalaswamy, Kroenig is an Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and Deputy Director for Strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. , Gopalaswamy is the Director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. He holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin., 11-12-2018, accessed on 8-11-2021, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Will disruptive technology cause nuclear war? - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/will-disruptive-technology-cause-nuclear-war/>)//Babcii

Rather, we should think more broadly about how new technology might affect global politics, and, for this, it is helpful to turn to scholarly international relations theory. The dominant theory of the causes of war in the academy is the “bargaining model of war.” This theory identifies rapid shifts **in the balance of power as a** primary cause of conflict. International politics often presents states with conflicts that they can settle through peaceful bargaining, but **when bargaining** breaks down, war results. Shifts in the balance of power are problematic because they undermine effective bargaining. After all, why agree to a deal today if your bargaining position will be stronger tomorrow? And, a clear understanding of the military balance of power can contribute to peace. (Why start a war you are likely to lose?) But **shifts in the balance of power** muddy understandings **of** which states have the advantage. You may see where this is going. New technologies threaten to create potentially destabilizing shifts in the balance of power. For decades, stability in Europe and Asia has been supported by US military power. In recent years, however, the balance of power in Asia has begun to shift, as China has increased its military capabilities. Already, Beijing has become more assertive in the region, claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. And the results of Russia’s military modernization have been on full display in its ongoing intervention in Ukraine. Moreover, China may have the lead over the United States in emerging technologies that could be decisive for the future of military acquisitions and warfare, including 3D printing, hypersonic missiles,quantum computing, 5G wireless connectivity, **and** artificial intelligence (AI). And Russian President Vladimir Putin is building new unmanned vehicles while ominously declaring, “Whoever leads in AI will rule the world.” If China or Russia are able to incorporate new technologies into their militaries before the United States, then this could lead to the kind of rapid shift in the balance of power **that** often causes war. If Beijing believes emerging technologies provide it with a newfound, local military advantage over the United States, for example, it may be **more willing** than previously **to** initiate conflict over Taiwan. And if Putin thinks new tech has strengthened his hand, he may be more tempted to launch a Ukraine-style invasion of a NATO member. Either scenario could bring these nuclear powers into direct conflict with the United States, and once nuclear armed states are at war, there is an inherent risk of nuclear conflictthrough limited nuclear war strategies, nuclear **brinkmanship**, or simple accidentor inadvertent escalation**.** This framing of the problem leads to a different set of policy implications. The concern is not simply technologies that threaten to undermine nuclear second-strike capabilities directly, but, rather, any technologies that can result in a meaningful shift in the broader balance of power. And **the** solution **is not** to preserve **second-strike** **capabilities, but** to preserve prevailing power balances more broadly. When it comes to new technology, this means that the United States should seek **to maintain an innovation edge**. Washington should also work with other states, including its nuclear-armed rivals, to develop a new set of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and export controls to deny these newer and potentially destabilizing technologies to potentially hostile states. These are no easy tasks, but **the consequences of Washington losing the race** for technological superiority to its autocratic challengers just **might mean nuclear Armageddon.**

#### Perception of AI alone triggers probing and proliferation

Zhang, 20 (Jiayu Zhang, Jiayu Zhang is a candidate in the Master of Arts Security Policy Studies program at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He received his undergraduate degree from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University. , 8-16-2020, accessed on 8-9-2021, THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, "China’s Military Employment of Artificial Intelligence and Its Security Implications", https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/blog-post-title-four-xgtap)//Babcii

China’s rapid progress in AI and its military application have encouraged such competition and may trigger a potential **arms race** in two ways. First, the PLA’s increasing military power facilitated by its application of AI technology has already activated a security dilemma, especially concerning China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes and growing ambitions about the regional order. The PLA’s employment of AI-enabled early-warning systems and unmanned intelligent combat vehicles will **enhance** China’s awareness of Japanese and South Korean operations in disputed areas like the Senkaku Islands and enable a quick response capability. From the perspective of other countries in the region, China’s **willingness to escalate** in such scenarios will increase because its AI technology would provide it with a decisive advantage in a conflict with limited costs, despite increasing the potential of accidental escalation.66 Other countries’ have begun to pursue more defense measures, a move that reflects concern about China’s potential threat, including the development of weapon-grade AI technology. Such defensive measures suggest that tensions triggered by the security dilemma in the region will be more complicated and expand beyond an AI arms race. **Nuclear proliferation**, targeting civilian infrastructure that supports AI technology, **and** more **cyber aggression** may be seen in this context. Second, China’s success in influencing U.S. strategic calculation and military posture by military employment of AI may encourage other countries to copy its success. Other countries who see themselves as **adversaries** of the United States may be motivated to increase AI investment and attempt to install related technology to their missiles to **exercise coercion and threats.** For U.S. **allies** like Japan, the introduction of AI in early-warning, situational awareness, and intelligence processing may not only help reduce reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, but also strengthen their ability to counter regional rivals like China and North Korea. Thus, the **proliferation of AI technology**, especially those can be weaponized, poses challenges to the arms control community in the region. Given the highly dual-use nature of AI, civilian AI technology cooperation between countries may contribute to the unintentional proliferation of destructive AI systems, a situation which is similar to the dual-use dilemma of nuclear cooperation.67 On the practical level, weapon-, behavior-, or country-focused controls will face different problems ranging from how to define controlled weapons to how to verify the control measures.68 On the political level, countries' attitudes toward AI arms control are ambiguous. In 2018, China demonstrated its “desire to negotiate and conclude” a new protocol for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to ban the use of autonomous lethal weapons systems.69 However, the delegation stressed that the ban should only apply to the use of such weapons, and not to their development, revealing China’s actual misgivings regarding arms control for autonomous systems.70 2. Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk Nuclear strategic stability is understood as “a state of affairs in which countries are confident that their adversaries would not be able to undermine their nuclear deterrence capability” using nuclear, conventional, cyber or other means.71 **Given** the **dynamics of nuclear posture** of major powers in the region and the potential role of nuclear escalation in certain scenarios, **AI-enabled improvement** of the PLA’s multi-domain operation capabilities **has** both **destabilizing** and stabilizing **impacts** on strategic stability.

#### That causes hotspot escalation and extinction

Montgomery, 16 (EVAN BRADEN Montgomery, Evan Braden Montgomery is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr.Montgomery graduated summa cum laude from Villanova University with a B.A. in Political Scienceand Sociology, and received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia., 2016, accessed on 7-23-2021, Csba, "EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE ", https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6183-ExtendedDeterrence\_PRINT.pdf)//Babcii

Extended deterrence can help the United States uphold the status quo in several ways. Specifically, it can **discourage revisionist powers from provoking crises** or launching wars because there is a high probability that Washington will intervene to deny their aims and punish them for acts of aggression; it can dissuade friendly nations from developing controversial military **capabilities** that might heighten local tensions or **trigger** regional **conflicts** because those nations can rely on the United States instead; and it can offer a source of leverage over security partners, one that helps the United States to discourage other courses of action that might prove destabilizing and encourage positive steps on a variety of issues. Despite its importance, extended deterrence is one of the most challenging aspects of American strategy. While persuading adversaries that the United States would retaliate for a direct attack is relatively easy, convincing them that it would retaliate for an attack against other nations is a much more difficult proposition. Furthermore, convincing allies that the United States will actually fight on their behalf—even if that means putting its own troops and territory at risk—can be even harder.4 As Thomas Schelling famously wrote, when it comes to deterrence, “The difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that have to be made credible.”5 Not surprisingly, efforts to make extended deterrence credible in the eyes of adversaries and allies alike have shaped virtually every aspect of American military power. For instance, the United States has adhered to a conventional military strategy that emphasizes countering threats when and where they emerge rather than depending on local nations to prevent aggression or roll back expansion; it has fielded combined-arms forces capable of resisting distant rivals, even those with quantitative advantages in men and materiel; and it has built a global network of military bases to deploy, operate, and sustain those forces overseas.6 Finally, but equally important, it has relied on its nuclear arsenal for the purpose of extending deterrence to its allies and partners.7 Throughout the Cold War, strategic nuclear weapons provided Washington with the capacity to conduct a devastating reprisal against the Soviet Union if Moscow ever launched a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland or the Red Army attempted to overrun Europe. At the same time, theater and battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which were permanently stationed on allied territory, could be used to blunt an offensive by numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces if NATO’s conventional units were not up to the task.8 These weapons were also used to “couple” the United States to its vulnerable frontline partners, who had doubts that Washington would truly employ its strategic nuclear forces on their behalf. By raising the prospect of early nuclear use against Soviet troops and territory, the presence of non-strategic weapons signaled a U.S. willingness to escalate in defense of its allies rather than withdrawal to North America in the face of a successful Soviet invasion.9 Over the past twenty-five years, however, many of the extended deterrence dilemmas that occupied U.S. policymakers in the past—especially the dilemmas associated with extended nuclear deterrence—ceased to be a major source of concern. With Russia in decline and China focused on sustaining its economic rise, treaty allies in Europe and Asia have been relatively safe from serious threats. Meanwhile, as the world’s sole superpower, the United States has enjoyed enormous military advantages over potential rivals and has been able to rely on its conventional forces to discourage aggression. This favorable situation appears to be changing, though, putting extended nuclear deterrence back on the agenda. For example, although the unipolar moment appeared to herald the waning of geopolitics and the end of major power security competitions, at least according to some observers, revisionist actors are once again challenging the status quo in multiple regions.10 **Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea, and support for rebel groups in eastern Ukraine** all indicate that Moscow does not respect the political order of post-Cold War Europe. At the same time, **China’s conventional military buildup** has shifted the balance of power in Asia, while its “**creeping expansion” in the South China Sea** could enable Beijing to assert greater control over one of the world’s most vital waterways. And despite the recent agreement to constrain its nuclear program, **Iran continues to build offensive missile forces** and support violent extremist groups. In short, Russia’s piecemeal efforts to restore its lost continental empire, China’s military expansion in its near seas and beyond, and Iran’s willingness to both create and fill power vacuums throughout its neighborhood all suggest that “geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage.”11 Compounding this trend, the world is now in the midst of what many analysts refer to as a “**second nuclear age**,” one that is arguably more complex and potentially more volatile than the bipolar U.S.–Soviet struggle that characterized the Cold War.12 Not only does the United States still need to worry about maintaining strategic stability with a nuclear peer, albeit one possessing far fewer weapons than it did in the past, but it must also manage a number of other existing and emerging challenges: the **proliferation** of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to fragile nations, the expansion of nuclear arsenals by minor powers and aspiring major powers, and the pursuit of capabilities that are lowering the barriers to nuclear use and **eroding the “firebreak**” between conventional and nuclear conflict.13

### 1AC --- Advantage --- Europe

#### Advantage two is Europe:

#### Platforms drive an existential fear of market takeover in Europe

Suominen, 20 (Kati Suominen , Kati Suominen is an adjunct fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Dr. Suominen holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Boston University, an M.B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations., 10-26-2020, accessed on 7-20-2021, Csis, "On the Rise: Europe’s Competition Policy Challenges to Technology Companies", https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-europes-competition-policy-challenges-technology-companies)//Babcii

WHAT IS **DRIVING EUROPEAN PROPOSALS**? Europe’s **antitrust** policy enforcement actions form part of a series of EU steps that have hampered U.S. companies over the past few years. Among them are the European Union’s 2018 copyright law forcing U.S. platforms to increasingly police content posted on their sites and adjudicate freedom of expression; the European Union’s 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that has cost American as well as European businesses billions of dollars to implement; Europe’s proposals to monitor data used for artificial intelligence applications; and several European nations’ [digital services taxes](https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/) that primarily impact U.S. technology companies by shifting corporate income taxes for digital services to where they are consumed, as opposed to where they are developed. In part, Europe’s proposals for greater antitrust powers against technology companies represent a continuation of a history of cases where European enforcers and courts applied [an array of tests](https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-071_goals_of_eu_competition_law_and_digital_economy.pdf) positing that a certain behavior is anticompetitive—such that it hurts potential competitors, consumer choice, or innovation. Indeed, the Commission’s interventionist approach has long contrasted with U.S. antitrust enforcers and courts that have largely accepted market leadership and consumer loyalty earned through hard competition and risky investments. For U.S. enforcers, protecting consumer welfare (or efficiency and lower cost)—rather than potential competitors—has been their North Star. There are, however, a number of reasons why Europe is acting now to establish a stricter muscular antitrust policy. First, European antitrust officials, much like policymakers in the United States, report being under great political **pressure to “do something” about big tech**nology companies. [Polls suggest](https://bdaily.co.uk/articles/2020/08/26/uk-consumers-put-a-price-on-privacy-half-would-pay-more-to-do-business-with-an-organisation-committed-to-protecting-their-personal-data) that most Europeans support the Commission’s actions against Google and other U.S. technology companies and worry about their personal data getting in the hands of America technology companies and, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, the U.S. government. Antitrust officials are also reported to be **pressured by local**, less digitized **businesses that struggle to compete with** the **digital platforms**, and too often rush to act on populist pressures, despite having no clear empirical basis. Second, Europe is using antitrust to clear space for its own companies in sectors it considers to be in Europe’s comparative advantage, such as financial services, the Internet of Things (IoT), smart factories and smart homes, and healthcare. Europeans have failed to seize on the various technology waves that brought us smartphones, cloud computing, search, and social media, and they lack the kind of market-leading platforms that the United States and China have produced such as Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, Google, Alibaba, and WeChat. Germany’s SAP, the Netherland’s Adyen, and Sweden’s Spotify have [barely 3 percent of the market capitalization](http://www.netzoekonom.de/plattform-oekonomie/) of major tech platforms compared to 68 percent held by U.S. companies. European policymakers are now concerned that **U.S. companies are going beyond their traditional** swim **lanes** of social networking, ecommerce, and search and moving into “European” sectors. After all, U.S. technology companies often look to apply their technologies in new sectors: Apple started its own credit card and TV service; Google bought Fitbit to get into the wearable tech market and; Amazon has become a global freight forwarder and air cargo carrier. In a more frontal attack, Tesla is now striking at Europe’s leadership in high-end, tech-driven vehicles, [looking to build a gigafactory outside of Berlin](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/13/business/tesla-elon-musk-berlin.html). Europe needs to pre-empt mergers that would enable these giants to reap even more **market share in Europe** or outright force American companies to open their proprietary data to European firms, so they can accelerate the build-out of valuable algorithms in new markets.

#### They’ll respond in kind with expanded antitrust that causes digital protectionism

Suominen, 20 (Kati Suominen , Kati Suominen is an adjunct fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Dr. Suominen holds a B.A. from the University of Arkansas, an M.A. from Boston University, an M.B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, and a Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations., 10-26-2020, accessed on 7-20-2021, Csis, "On the Rise: Europe’s Competition Policy Challenges to Technology Companies", https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-europes-competition-policy-challenges-technology-companies)//Babcii

Both the United States and Europe are currently debating the merits of these arguments—including whether antitrust law should be retailored to address them. In the **United States, antitrust enforcement officials and courts** have, in general, **accepted market leadership earned through competition** in the marketplace, as long as it leads to greater efficiencies and cost savings for consumers. In contrast, the European Commission antitrust officials have tended to favor protecting potential competitors, even if market leaders have managed to outperform competitors and gain consumer loyalty through their ingenuity and smart acquisitions. One of the outcomes of this approach has yielded recent investigations and multi-billion-dollar fines by the European Commission on American companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon for supposedly violating European competition policy rules. Today, the business climate for American technology companies is **heating up in Europe**. Concerned about Europe’s lack of competitiveness in the global digital economy, both the European Commission and various EU member states are looking to significantly **expand their antitrust powers** to curb large technology companies. One way they do this is by blocking pre-eminent firms’ planned mergers and acquisitions and forcing them to provide access to the data they have gathered—to the benefit of European competitors. Europe’s hardening antitrust stance poses significant problems to **U.S. business interests in Europe’s** giant digital market—Europe’s business-to-consumer (B2C) e-commerce sales alone are climbing [past $850](https://ecommercenews.eu/ecommerce-in-europe-e717-billion-in-2020/) [billion this year](https://ecommercenews.eu/ecommerce-in-europe-e717-billion-in-2020/). The Commission’s approach also risks **digital protectionism** and **politicization** of antitrust enforcement, which could have **significant implications for trade** relations between the United States and the European Union and for many emerging markets’ thinking about competition policy issues.

#### That upsets all future cooperation of digital trade

Barshefsky, 20 (Charlene Barshefsky, Charlene Barshefsky served as United States Trade Representative, the country's top trade negotiator, from 1997 to 2001. She was the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from 1993 to 1997. JD from colombus school of law, 8-2-2020, accessed on 7-21-2021, Financial Times, "EU digital protectionism risks damaging ties with the US", https://www.ft.com/content/9edea4f5-5f34-4e17-89cd-f9b9ba698103)//Babcii

Europe should reconsider its digital sovereignty agenda and instead pursue greater regulatory co-operation with the US. Demonising US technology companies hinders efforts to address the foremost challenge for both sides with respect to the digital economy: China. Chinese protectionism — which fuses state and Communist party control, and creates subsidies and intellectual property theft on an unparalleled scale — poses **an existential threat to** a vibrant digital **economy**. For example, China is pressing for a new centrally controlled internet, which the US and EU oppose. If Europe persists in its approach, US policymakers will have **no choice but to treat it as a strategic threat**. In the near term, it is **difficult to imagine** that the US will be able to strike **a meaningful trade deal** with the EU — a priority of both sides for many years — so long as the EU pursues the techno-nationalist moves aimed at the US. The Europeans **need to reverse course** before the economic and geopolitical **damage cannot be undone**.

#### It’s the core issue --- Tech antitrust opens the floodgates

Giarda et al., 21 (Raffaele Giarda et al., head of Baker McKenzie's Technology Media & Telecoms Industry Group New York University (M.C.J.) (1994)Columbia University (Summer Program American Law) (1990)University of Rome (J.D., with honors) (1989), 2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Bakermckenzie, "TMT Looking Ahead", <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2021/01/tmt-looking-ahead-2021.pdf?la=en)//Babcii>

The long-mooted increased regulation of digital services and markets in Europe landed in December 2020 in the form of two draft regulations, the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. In 2021, digital service providers will be focused on preparing their businesses for the changes ahead, as both proposals navigate the legislative process. The DSA and DMA will not be the only items **near the top of** corporate **agendas in 2021**. Others are likely to include monitoring the continued efforts to find international consensus on tax reforms for the digital economy and addressing the impact of any further developments in the ongoing technology-focused trade wars. AT A GLANCE The EU Digital Services Act: What does the future hold? The European Commission has published its landmark draft new rules applicable to digital services (the Digital Services Act). The DSA shares common themes with the Digital Markets Act (see below) in particular (re) assigning liability or responsibility for possible online harms and a push for even greater transparency from market players. We examine what is actually new for TMT industry players and what lies ahead in these proposals which cover key areas, including safe harbours, notice and take down, know-your-trader requirements, reporting obligations and annual reviews of systemic risks by very large platforms (as defined in the DSA). The EU Digital Markets Act: New rules for platforms. Published alongside the proposed Digital Services Act, the proposals in the Digital Markets Act focus on the largest platforms (gatekeepers) which supply "core platform services" and seek to address what the European Commission perceives as **power asymmetries between platforms**, their business users and end users. Another area of focus is around general market structure — to ensure markets remain "fair and contestable". We look at the definition and role of gatekeepers and the key obligations that will apply under the DMA as well as the road ahead. Trade wars and protectionism — Digital sovereignty under attack? **The** TMT **sector is at the center of disruptive global trade** wars as **geopolitics collide with new technologies and economies are increasingly driven by technological innovation**. Examples include the use of **export controls** to protect "crown jewel" technology, **import restrictions** and **tariffs**, procurement bans and **foreign investment controls** which target key industry players on the basis of perceived national security concerns and **in pursuit of digital sovereignty**. As the concerns underlying these measures are deeply rooted and change is unlikely at the macro level in the short term, we provide an overview of the most important challenges TMT businesses are facing.

#### Digital protectionism undermines global trade

GCGS, 21 (GCGS, Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4-12-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Council on Foreign Relations, "The Rise of Digital Protectionism", https://www.cfr.org/report/rise-digital-protectionism)//Babcii

Despite the limitations brought about by Europe’s digital **restrictions**, participants largely agreed that Europe is more an irritant than **a major threat** and that the EU could help the United States push back against **Chinese digital protectionism**. A Digital Economy Drives Globalization Barriers to the free flow of data and digital information are consequential to the United States, participants said, because the global digital economy has quickly become a large part of cross-border trade flows. Participants estimated that cross-border data and digital flows account for between $2.8 trillion and $4 trillion of the $7 trillion to $15 trillion in total cross-border flows of goods and services. Moreover, although **cross-border flows in traditional goods** and services **flatlined** after the 2008 financial crisis, **data and digital flows have continually grown**, increasing eighty-fold since 2005. Participants noted that the **digital economy is the sole part of globalization that is still proceeding** apace and is more diffuse than traditional globalization, given the active role that smaller firms and smaller countries play. One participant argued that the digital economy is “shifting the nature of globalization,” by deepening cross-border trade in virtual goods even as growth in physical trade has been nearly stagnant. New technologies are creating economic opportunities, but **creeping protectionism**, especially in China, **could** **threaten** U.S. competitiveness in **critical sectors**. Participants highlighted massive Chinese investment in semiconductors, for example, as well as China’s dominance of the supply chains for fifth-generation mobile phones, not to mention Chinese determination to stake out a leading position in sectors such as AI, robotics, electric and autonomous vehicles, and biotechnology. China’s digital approach, one participant noted, has already resulted in its dominance of crucial sectors, “and they will dominate going forward.” But It Affects the Old Economy, Too Digital protectionism does not just pose a risk to U.S. competitiveness in sectors at the center of the future economy, it also threatens traditional sectors such as manufacturing, energy, and agriculture. Participants noted that advanced manufacturing has a large and growing data component: 3-D printing and digital manufacturing, for example, rely on cross-border data flows as well as a data-intensive research and development program. Traditional sectors such as agriculture are seeing a growing role for data, for example, in biotechnology and the development of new strains of seeds. Likewise, extractive industries and the energy sector are being transformed to rely increasingly on data, from geological big data crunching that enabled the hydraulic fracturing revolution to global shipping that is becoming increasingly automated. In that sense, some participants suggested, China’s digital protectionism, while boosting its dominance of high-tech sectors, could backfire in other areas. The rise of big data across a growing number of sectors is helped by jurisdictions such as the United States that allow unfettered data flows. Europe’s tough privacy laws also discourage innovation among technology firms; data localization requirements push tech startups to American shores, where compliance costs are lower. One participant suggested differentiating and regulating data—from anonymous industrial data to regular user information, to extremely sensitive, personal information such as health records—according to its sensitivity. Maintaining cross-border data flows with few government restrictions will be **important as the digital transformation plays out** in traditional sectors. As one participant put it, networks matter: an economy that tries to insulate itself from global data flows by throwing up restrictions to cross-border data-sharing risks cutting itself off rather than protecting its national champions.

#### Interdependence checks all conflicts --- Disruptions go nuclear

Drezner, 16 (Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics at Tufts University, Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in Economics in Stanford University, B.A. in Political Economy from Williams College, May 2016, accessed on 8-11-2021, Brookings Institution, "Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy", https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IOS-Drezner-web.pdf)

Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades.105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought.106 The liberal logic is straightforward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after the 2008 financial crisis.107 Similarly, global financiers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics.108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital. Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times.109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has elevated tensions without leading to anything approaching war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place. Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint.111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exacerbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence.112 A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output.113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2014.114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”115 If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more.116 A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-user markets, shortening the global supply chain.117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple component parts of a larger manufactured good eliminates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmission of data would substitute for transportation of goods.”118 As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines.119 Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth**.** More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward. There have been other drivers of the decades-long reduction in militarized interstate disputes. Nuclear deterrence has helped curb violent conflict among the great powers. Multilateral peacekeeping missions mitigate small country conflicts. Even if there is a decline in interdependence, it is possible that the “Long Peace” will endure. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the degree to which either innovations or geopolitics will lessen the need for international trade. Even technological optimists acknowledge that the future diffusion of 3D printing is unclear. Advocates of networked manufacturing insist that economic openness is a prerequisite for the process to continue.122 And the degree of geopolitical revisionism among great powers might be endogenous—that is to say, preexisting levels of globalization might constrain revisionist impulses, rather than such impulses weakening the globalized economy. If great powers resort to revisionist foreign policies, however, then the global economy will start to resemble the Cold War era of economic blocs and strategic embargoes—one in which trade and investment follow the flag rather than follow the rate of return. The increased American use of targeted financial sanctions, for example, has already generated grumblings from peer competitors about finding ways to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.123 In 2015, China introduced its own international payment and settlements system, in part, to diversify away from reliance upon the dollar.124 The correlation of economic flows with geopolitical alliances would not just have a profound effect on cross-border flows; it would likely lead to the fragmentation of global economic governance. Just as significantly, great power governments would reverse post-Cold War trends and choose to allocate more scarce resources towards their militaries.

#### Ending digital protectionism paves the way for internet cooperation

Moghior, 21 (Cosmina Moghior, Cosmina is a Denton Fellow with the Transatlantic Leadership program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)., 8-11-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, CEPA, "Protectionism Threatens To Torpedo The Transatlantic Technology Alliance | CEPA", https://cepa.org/protectionism-threatens-to-torpedo-the-transatlantic-technology-alliance/)//Babcii

Europe similarly is **determined to build its own tech** capacities. It promotes the concept of [digital sovereignty](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651992/EPRS_BRI(2020)651992_EN.pdf) aimed at providing the continent the capacity to make “autonomous technological choices.” Several projects promote domestic production of critical technologies ranging from next-generation mobile phone production to quantum computing. Public funds already are being spent on the European cloud computing project GAIA-X aims to break the U.S. stranglehold on cloud computing. While Europe insists that its actions are not protectionist, designed instead to promote and safeguard European values, GAIA-X aims to ensure data protection and limit access of U.S. intelligence to European data. U.S. tech giants including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft have been invited to join, but are banned from joining the board. The **U.S.** is home to the world’s largest Internet companies and **fears that European regulatory measures will discriminate against them**. Plans for a European “digital” tax – put on hold to secure a global corporate tax reform – would disproportionately impact American companies that provide digital services in Europe. A separate Digital Markets Act proposal under consideration at the European Parliament addresses unfair practices of the so-called “gatekeepers,” that operate “core platform services.” Most of the targeted companies will likely be American, beginning with giants Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. Europe and the U.S. **need to step back from pursuing their protectionist instincts**, which threatens to allow [China’s increasing inroads into the digital market](https://www.brookings.edu/research/untangling-the-web-why-the-us-needs-allies-to-defend-against-chinese-technology-transfer/). **Beijing is making** [**investments**](https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/) **on all continents** on projects ranging from education to [critical infrastructure](https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/727852/DIIS_RP_2016_8_WEB.pdf). Many **countries are turning to China for support** and guidance on technological development while the U.S. and the EU focus on their domestic anxieties and ambitions. A transatlantic tech **alliance could provide the blueprint for offering a viable alternative to** Chinese inroads in **the developing world**. Europe and the U.S. need to coordinate against the export of authoritarian practices on the Internet. They can only do this by **dropping the push for** Buy American and **European Digital Sovereignty.**

#### Otherwise, authoritarians will fragment the internet

DuPont, 20 (Sam DuPont, Deputy Director, Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative, Washington, DC, 11-23-2020, accessed on 1-18-2021, Wita, "The Biden Administration Should Pursue a Digital Trade Agreement", https://www.wita.org/blogs/biden-digital-trade-agreement/)//Babcii

A forward-looking **digital trade agreement would guarantee** that all these services and more can compete **internationally**—and that the data upon which they depend can flow freely across borders. Successfully negotiating such an agreement with a large group of **trading partners would** be a boon to U.S. businesses and workers, and there is every reason to believe it would be a political winner on both sides of the aisle. What is more, it would also **advance** the **geostrategic interests** of the United States. An agreement that helps ensure the global digital economy defaults toward free commerce, the free exchange of ideas, and the free flow of data will help the United States and its allies confront and compete with China. At home, the Chinese government has implemented a top-down, repressive model for controlling the internet. And it has used negotiations, influence, and raw power to advocate this model overseas—seeking to build a [coalition of countries](https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-vision-for-cyber-sovereignty-and-the-global-governance-of-cyberspace/) with separate, sovereign internets characterized by greater government control over information—in order to validate its domestic approach and enhance its global influence. **The campaign is working: Governments around the world have followed China’s lead by restricting the free flow of information**, blocking online services, and **fragmenting the internet** along national boundaries. Earlier this year, Freedom House documented a [10th consecutive year of decline](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2020/pandemics-digital-shadow) in global “internet freedom,” and the U.S. trade representative cataloged an ever-growing [list of barriers to digital trade](https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2020/march/fact-sheet-2020-national-trade-estimate-strong-binding-rules-advance-digital-trade). It is not enough for the United States to play defense against these efforts—the Biden administration should advance a proactive strategy to ensure an open, global internet with rules that are rooted in democratic values. One of the most effective ways the Biden administration can pursue this goal is by negotiating enforceable rules and commitments on digital trade that bind together a large group of countries with shared values and common interests. A digital trade agreement should be built around rules that guarantee the free flow of data, prohibit data localization requirements, and ban unfair policies that discriminate against foreign digital products and services.

#### Open internet solves extinction

- Disease, natural disasters, state collapse and limits of growth

Eagleman 10 (David Eagleman is a neuroscientist at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law and author of Sum (Canongate). Nov. 9, 2010, “Six ways the internet will save civilization,”  
 <http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no>)//Babcii

Many great civilizations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. Usually this results from: **natural disasters, resource depletion, economic meltdown, disease,** poor information flow and corruption. But we’re luckier than our predecessors because we command a technology that no one else possessed: a rapid communication network that finds its highest expression in the internet. I propose that there are six ways in which **the net** has vastly **reduced the threat of societal collapse. Epidemics can be deflected by telepresence** One of our more dire prospects for collapse is an infectious-disease epidemic. Viral and bacterial epidemics precipitated the fall of the Golden Age of Athens, the Roman Empire and most of the empires of the Native Americans. The internet can be our key to survival because the ability to work telepresently can inhibit microbial transmission by reducing human-to-human contact. In the face of an otherwise devastating epidemic, businesses can keep supply chains running with the maximum number of employees working from home. This can reduce host density below the tipping point required for an epidemic. If we are well prepared when an epidemic arrives, we can fluidly shift into a self-quarantined society in which microbes fail due to host scarcity. Whatever the social ills of isolation, they are worse for the microbes than for us. The **internet will predict natural disasters** We are witnessing the downfall of slow central control in the media: news stories are increasingly becoming user-generated nets of up-to-the-minute information. During the recent California wildfires, locals went to the TV stations to learn whether their neighbourhoods were in danger. But the news stations appeared most concerned with the fate of celebrity mansions, so Californians changed their tack: they uploaded geotagged mobile-phone pictures, updated Facebook statuses and tweeted. The balance tipped: the internet carried news about the fire more quickly and accurately than any news station could. In this grass-roots, decentralised scheme, there were embedded reporters on every block, and the news shockwave kept ahead of the fire. This head start could provide the extra hours that save us. If the Pompeiians had had the internet in 79AD, they could have easily marched 10km to safety, well ahead of the pyroclastic flow from Mount Vesuvius. If the Indian Ocean had the Pacific’s networked tsunami-warning system, South-East Asia would look quite different today. Discoveries are retained and shared Historically, critical information has required constant rediscovery. Collections of learning -- from the library at Alexandria to the entire Minoan civilisation -- have fallen to the bonfires of invaders or the wrecking ball of natural disaster. Knowledge is hard won but easily lost. And information that survives often does not spread. Consider smallpox inoculation: this was under way in India, China and Africa centuries before it made its way to Europe. By the time the idea reached North America, native civilisations who needed it had already collapsed. The net solved the problem. New discoveries catch on immediately; information spreads widely. In this way, societies can optimally ratchet up, using the latest bricks of knowledge in their fortification against risk. Tyranny is mitigated **Censorship of ideas** was a familiar spectre in the last century, with state-approved news outlets ruling the press, airwaves and copying machines in the USSR, Romania, Cuba, **China**, Iraq **and elsewhere**. In many cases, such as Lysenko’s agricultural despotism in the USSR, it **directly contributed to** the **collapse** of the nation. Historically, **a more successful strategy has been** to confront **free speech** with free speech -- and the internet allows this in a natural way. It democratises the flow of information by offering access to the newspapers of the world, the photographers of every nation, the bloggers of every political stripe. Some posts are full of doctoring and dishonesty whereas others strive for independence and impartiality -- but all are available to us to sift through. Given the attempts by **some governments to build firewalls**, it’s **clear** that this benefit of **the net requires constant vigilance**. Human capital is vastly increased Crowdsourcing brings people together to solve problems. Yet far fewer than one per cent of the world’s population is involved. We need expand human capital. Most of the world not have access to the education afforded a small minority. For every Albert Einstein, Yo-Yo Ma or Barack Obama who has educational opportunities, uncountable others do not. This squandering of talent translates into reduced economic output and a smaller pool of problem solvers. **The net** opens the gates education to anyone with a computer. A motivated teen anywhere on the planet can walk through the world’s knowledge -- from the webs of Wikipedia to the curriculum of MIT’s OpenCourseWare. The new human capital **will serve us well when we confront existential threats** we’ve never imagined before. Energy expenditure is reducedSocietal collapse can often be understood in terms of an **energy budget**: when energy spend outweighs energy return, collapse ensues. This has taken the form of **deforestation or soil erosion**; currently, the worry involves **fossil-fuel depletion**. The internet addresses the energy problem with a natural ease. Consider the massive energy savings inherent in the shift from paper to electrons -- as seen in the transition from the post to email. Ecommerce reduces the need to drive long distances to purchase products. Delivery trucks are more eco-friendly than individuals driving around, not least because of tight packaging and optimisation algorithms for driving routes. Of course, there are energy costs to the banks of computers that underpin the internet -- but these costs are less than the wood, coal and oil that would be expended for the same quantity of information flow. The tangle of events that triggers societal collapse can be complex, and there are several threats the net does not address. But vast, networked communication can be an antidote to several of the most deadly **diseases threatening civilisation**. The next time your coworker laments internet addiction, the banality of tweeting or the decline of face-to-face conversation, you may want to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

#### Independently --- European tech antitrust nukes global cybersecurity

Ledgett, 21 (Rick Ledgett, Rick Ledgett is the former deputy director of the National Security Agency and a member of the advisory board for Beacon Global Strategies, which advises U.S. technology companies. Ledgett has an undergraduate degree in psychology and a graduate degree in strategic intelligence., 6-15-2021, accessed on 7-21-2021, C4ISRNet, "The growing threat of European tech regulation on US innovation", https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2021/06/15/the-growing-threat-of-european-tech-regulation-on-us-innovation/)//Babcii

Such comments lay bare that although the DMA’s purported goal is to ensure competition, the DMA as drafted would specifically target a narrow set of **American companies** large enough to meet an arbitrary threshold of size metrics. Unlike the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which impacts any company that collects the data of any EU citizen, only a handful of U.S. companies fit the criteria of what the DMA calls a “gatekeeper.” With EU officials unable to identify a single EU company that would have to comply with the strict requirements mandated for gatekeepers, it is clear whom these regulaations are intended to cover: American platforms that have achieved a competitive advantage within the nascent European technology market. Of note, **Russian and Chinese companies are** also **exempted** from the DMA, despite these companies being in a much stronger position than their European competitors to fill any gap caused by a U.S. “gatekeeper” being forced to change its business models to comply with the DMA. As a result, the DMA could effectively give a **green light** to China and Russia to further expand influence in the EU via their technology companies. Among the list of problematic challenges with the DMA, one of the obligations that stands out is a requirement that **would force gatekeepers to allow** third-party software to be downloaded directly from the internet. “**Side-loading**” is currently prohibited by companies like Apple, given concerns about the potential vulnerabilities that could be introduced when an unvetted app is able to bypass company security and safety controls. Many parts of the U.S. government prohibit side-loading on work devices for these very reasons, with the General Services Administration (GSA) stating in its IT Security Procedural Guide that side-loading apps present “one of the **greatest risks** to GSA’s environment.” The **Department of Homeland Security** (DHS) also recommends users “avoid (and enterprises should prohibit on their devices) sideloading.” The U.S. government is not the only entity to warn against sidel-loading: the EU’s own Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) states, ”users should not sideload applications if they do not originate from a legitimate and authentic source.” As is shown after each cybersecurity breach, from petty cybercrime to the seismic effects of the SolarWinds and Colonial breaches, having an **integrated security system is essential to** the **overall security** of a technology platform. In effect, the DMA risks introducing additional vulnerabilities to systems already under near constant **attack from adversaries**. Other concerning obligations would [require](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1608116887159&uri=COM%3A2020%3A842%3AFIN) U.S. companies to distribute proprietary information and intellectual property to EU competitors, as well as provide competitors access to “operating system, hardware or software features” used by U.S. companies. This forced sharing of sensitive company methods and information could disincentivize gatekeepers from continuing to maintain **cutting-edge security standards** and innovative practices. With each new advancement, they could be [**forced to share**](https://www.csis.org/analysis/digital-services-act-digital-markets-act-and-new-competition-tool)**trade secrets with direct competitors** who had no obligation to do the same. Over the long term, this could hurt the U.S.’s ability to compete with the growing technology power of China.

#### Weak cybersecurity causes nuclear war

Klare, 19 (Michael T. Klare, Professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, "Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation," Arms Control Association, November 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation)//Babcii

Yet another pathway to **escalation could arise from** a cascading series of **cyberstrikes and counterstrikes** against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All **major powers, along with Iran and North Korea**, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic **attacks** of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, **could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks** against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually **leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict**. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing **widespread disorder** in both countries and **generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks**. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

#### Only the fed can assuage Europe’s fear

Wheeler, 21 (Tom Wheeler, Tom Wheeler is a visiting fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution. Former chariman of the Chairman of the FCC., 2-10-2021, accessed on 8-18-2021, Brookings, "A focused federal agency is necessary to oversee Big Tech", <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/)//Babcii>

A less obvious challenge presented by **the fed**eral government’**s failure** to effectively oversee the dominant digital companies is how it has left American companies unprotected in regard to the policies of other nations, and even individual American states. The United States is a worldwide leader in digital products and services for many reasons, but most notably because of its uniform market of 325 million consumers in which to develop products, products that are then widely available to an interconnected world. Such an advantage is [threatened](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/03/26/the-tragedy-of-tech-companies-getting-the-regulation-they-want/) when the absence of federal government policy leadership opens the door for policies to be determined by others. In an interconnected world, the absence of national oversight and leadership **leaves U.S. companies exposed to rules made by other nations**. Because of this absence, there is little American input. Similarly, the **absence of a national policy encourages state governments** to develop their own answers to pressing digital economy questions—answers that run the risk of diminishing the advantage of a uniform national marketplace. States as diverse as [California](https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa) and [Vermont](https://www.vpr.org/post/public-utility-commission-vermont-can-regulate-internet-telecommunications#stream/0) are adopting their own approaches to internet governance, while **foreign nations are filling the leadership void** internationally. The European Union proposed a [**Digital Services Act**](https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package) **to regulate the behavior** of online companies. The United Kingdom proposed the creation of a [new digital watchdog](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-regulation-cooperation-forum). Italy [announced](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27D0MM) an investigation into Google’s advertising market activities. Germany is [investigating](https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-germany-competition/german-watchdog-launches-new-investigation-into-amazon-report-idUKKBN27D2OO) Amazon’s relationships with third-party sellers. China went so far as to attempt to push a [new internet architecture](https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/nato-warns-new-authoritarian/) through the U.N.’s International Telecommunications Union. **American market** oversight **policies have traditionally been the North Star** in the development of international technology policy.[[7]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-focused-federal-agency-is-necessary-to-oversee-big-tech/#footnote-7) Where there is **no policy**, however, **there can be no pole star**. By being absent from the field, the federal government has walked away from a history of American leadership.

#### Speed and clarity are key --- Fear of entrenchment drives quick action

Dorpe, 21 (Simon Van Dorpe, Simon Van Dorpe is a competition reporter in Brussels, co-author of Politico's weekly Fair Play Newsletter and occasionally reports on Belgian politics., 7-2-2021, accessed on 7-21-2021, POLITICO, "What Vestager can teach Lina Khan on antitrust", https://www.politico.eu/article/margrethe-vestager-lina-khan-meeting/)//Babcii

3. **Need for speed** A **broad consensus** exists among antitrust lawyers, regulators and others who follow the issue that Europe’s Google cases, particularly those on its search engine, have progressed too slowly. This is particularly problematic in fast-moving digital markets as rivals cannot survive as long. “The Commission was **sending an ambulance to a funeral**,” is how Luther Lowe, senior vice president of public policy at Yelp, has put it. Yelp, the online review site, has complained to both EU and U.S. authorities about [Google’s treatment](https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-failed-to-tame-google-can-the-us-do-any-better/) of rivals. Vestager can relate about the many ways in which these cases can be delayed. In the Google Shopping case, for example, Vestager's predecessor Joaquín Almunia spent a lot of time negotiating a settlement with Google that in the end did not receive the backing of the other EU commissioners. 4. What cases can do (and where rules are needed) The takeaways from the antitrust cases brought by the European Commission and a number of national competition authorities — and the [**pressure**](https://www.politico.eu/?p=1136434) **from EU countries — have led** Vestager under her new digital powers **to** propose **a** legal **framework to regulate the behavior of large online firms**. Unlike antitrust enforcement, which looks at whether firms have breached broad rules in the past, the new, more prescriptive rules are aimed at forcing the companies to self-regulate before any potential anti-competitive behavior could occur. This is where Khan can engage on an equal footing, as she was deeply involved in the [proposal](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/06/house-democrats-antitust-overhaul-big-tech-426840) of **a massive overhaul of U.S. laws to rein in Big Tech**. Last week, the House Judiciary Committee [passed](https://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2021/06/24/house-panel-approves-plan-to-help-break-up-tech-giants-1386987) the first package of those bills. The interaction **might help** Khan prioritize which practices could most effectively be dealt with through competition enforcement. 5. Breaking up the companies Despite calls from complainants and politicians to break the companies up, Vestager has repeatedly said that was only a measure of last resort. That is also her position for the new gatekeeper rules. "We’ll have the power to fine gatekeepers that breach their obligations — but just as importantly, the proposal would make it possible to impose remedies ... that, if necessary, could go all the way to breaking up the company," she [said](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/vestager/announcements/defending-competition-digital-age_en) last week, adding that "of course, in this case, a structural remedy, where the company has to sell part of its business, would be very much a last resort — just as it is with our antitrust rules." Breaking up companies is easier in the U.S. than in the EU, though a court hasn't ordered that as a remedy for anticompetitive behavior since AT&T in the 1980s. "U.S. jurisprudence makes absolutely clear that structural reorganization is part of the conventional toolkit of abuse of dominance remedies in the U.S.," Kovacic said. Vestager’s reticence may not only be due to the difficulty of splitting up monopolies under the current state of EU law, but also because Europe is not eager to lose political capital by **doing what it believes should have been done in the U.S.**

### 1AC --- Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on platform utilities by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to include standards against owning and competing on the same platform and the acquisition of potential and/or nascent competitors

### 1AC --- Solvency

#### The plan effectively targets only the most dominant tech companies

Klipa, 19 (Nik Decosta Klipa, 3-13-2019, accessed on 9-2-2021, Boston.com, "4 things to know about how — and if — Elizabeth Warren's plan to break up the tech giants would work", https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2019/03/13/elizabeth-warren-big-tech-plan/)//Babcii

2. How exactly would she break up Big Tech? Going further than the Microsoft settlement, Warren’s plan aims to “restore competition to the tech sector” through two approaches. The first would be through legislation to designate companies that have more than $25 billion in annual global revenue and offer “an online marketplace, an exchange, or a platform for connecting third parties” as “platform utilities.” These companies would be prohibited from both running a marketplace and acting as a participant in it. They would also be required to meet “a standard of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory dealing with users.” “If you run a platform where others come to sell, then you don’t get to sell your own items on the platform because you have two comparative advantages,” Warren [told The Verge over the weekend](https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust). “One, you’ve sucked up information about every buyer and every seller before you’ve made a decision about what you’re going to sell. And second, you have the capacity — because you run the platform — to prefer your product over anyone else’s product. It gives an enormous comparative advantage to the platform.” In her Medium post, Warren said that Amazon Marketplace, Google’s ad exchange, and Google Search would be platform utilities under her proposed law. That means Google Search would have to be spun off from its sprawling parent company, Alphabet. Google-owned ad providers would also have to be split off in order to participate on the company’s ad exchange. Amazon Basics, which sells generic brand electronics and home accessories on Amazon’s website, would have to be broken off into its own company. And in her interview with The Verge, Warren confirmed that Apple would have to be broken up in order to keep offering apps on its App Store. “Apple, you’ve got to break it apart from their App Store,” she said. “It’s got to be one or the other. Either they run the platform or they play in the store. They don’t get to do both at the same time.” Warren’s team says the $25 billion threshold provides a clear line that only captures the most powerful companies. And while there’s a huge list of companies with revenue over that threshold, **very few** of them offer online marketplaces — which are [**different than an online store**](https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-an-online-marketplace-and-an-online-platform) — in which they also compete. Retail giants, like Walmart, or groceries store chains, would still be able to sell their own branded products alongside other brands on their online stores, since they process and fulfill the orders themselves (as opposed to letting third-parties list and sell their products on the website).

#### It effectively breaks them up

D'Souza, 20 (Deborah D'Souza, Deborah received her bachelor's degree in English from Fergusson College. She earned her master's degree in social anthropology at the University of Oxford and her master's degree in journalism from Columbia University., 9-12-2020, accessed on 9-1-2021, Investopedia, "Elizabeth Warren's Plan to Break Up Big Tech Explained", https://www.investopedia.com/how-will-elizabeth-warren-break-up-big-tech-4772263)//Babcii

The Plan [Among Warren's 48 plans](https://www.investopedia.com/elizabeth-warren-s-economic-plan-explained-4706529), is the "How we can break up Big Tech" plan. According to her, companies acquire smaller rivals and use their proprietary online marketplaces to unfairly limit competition. Her plan to fix this consists of two main parts and some goals for the future: Online Marketplaces = Platform Utilities Warren wants to pass legislation that requires **online marketplaces** run by companies with annual global revenue above $90 million to be designated as "**platform utilities." Companies with annual global revenue above $25 billion will not be allowed to own** platform **utilities and participants** on it at the same time. In other words, companies will not be able to sell services on a public marketplace they own and control. Platform utilities will have to treat all users fairly and equally. If sued and found guilty of violating the neutrality requirement, they would have to pay a fine equal to 5% of their annual revenue. **Reversing mergers** Warren will also appoint federal regulators who will reverse "**illegal**" and "**anti-competitive**" mergers. Goals Her three goals are to give people more control over how their personal data is collected, shared, and sold, help news outlets and artists keep more of the value their content generates, and ensure that no foreign power uses social media to influence U.S. elections. What the Plan Means for the FAANGs **Facebook**: Under Warren's plan, Facebook's 2012 acquisition of Instagram and 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp would be reversed, something Zuckerberg called an "existential" threat. "Facebook would face real pressure from Instagram and WhatsApp to improve the user experience and protect our privacy," says Warren's campaign website. Seventy percent of U.S. adults and 51% of U.S. teens use Facebook, according to [Pew Research](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/). However, 70% of U.S. teens use Instagram, the platform Facebook is using to compete with the likes of Snap Inc. and TikTok. The company will be depending on Instagram to drive ad revenue in the coming years. **Amazon**: Amazon.com Inc. ([AMZN](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=amzn)) would **not be allowed to sell its own products** alongside third-party sellers on Amazon.com, if Warren's legislation is passed. Its privately-owned brands, like AmazonBasics, would have to be spun off or shuttered. Its mergers with Whole Foods (2017) and Zappos (2009) would also be unwound. Most of the hundreds of brands Amazon owns haven't had too much success, but Oweise Khazi, senior principal at Gartner L2, told [Retail Dive](https://www.retaildive.com/news/with-private-brands-amazon-plays-the-long-game/550790/) that Amazon is "playing the long game" and will be studying the massive amount of data it has access to. **Apple**: Apple Inc. ([AAPL](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=aapl)) is not among the companies mentioned on Warren's official campaign website, but the **AppStore would also qualify as a platform utility**. This means Apple would not be able to sell its own applications, like Apple Music and Apple News, on the platform. “It’s got to be one or the other,” said Warren when asked about it by [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust). “Either they run the platform or they play in the store. They don’t get to do both at the same time.” This would come in the way Apple's Services business ambitions. Netflix: Netflix Inc. ([NFLX](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=nflx)) faces little regulatory risk at this point. In March 2019, BMO Capital Markets made Netflix its top technology stock instead of Amazon for this reason, according to [CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/bmo-favors-netflix-over-amazon-because-of-sen-warren.html). The debate about whether the company is a budding [monopoly](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopoly.asp) with its massive original content budget is still ongoing. Alphabet Inc. ([GOOGL](https://www.investopedia.com/markets/quote?tvwidgetsymbol=googl)): **Google’s Ad Exchange and** Google **Search are both platform utilities** under the proposed law and would **need to be spun off**. Alternatively, Google would have to stop including its own comparison shopping service, restaurant ratings etc. in search results, because it would be competing with other companies like Yelp, and separate its business from Ad Exchange. Its acquisitions of Waze, Nest and DoubleClick would also be unwound

# 2AC --- Northwestern R3

## Adv---China

### 2AC --- AI DA --- F/L

#### 1. Startups and venture capital are decreasing now

**Nadler, 20** (Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, Comittee on the Judiciary, 20, accessed on 8-22-2021, Judiciary.house, "SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW", https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition\_in\_digital\_markets.pdf?utm\_campaign=4493-519)//Babcii

In recent decades, however, there has been a sharp decline in new business formation as well as early-stage startup funding.169 The number of new technology firms in the digital economy has declined,170 while the entrepreneurship rate—the share of startups and young firms in the industry as a whole—has also fallen significantly in this market.171 Unsurprisingly, there has also been a sharp reduction in early-stage funding for technology startups.172 The rates of entrepreneurship and job creation have also declined over this period. The entrepreneurship rate—defined as the “share of startups and young firms” in the industry as a whole— fell from 60% in 1982 to a low of 38% as of 2011.173 As entry slows, the average age of technology firms has skewed older.174 Job creation in the high-technology sector has likewise slowed considerably.175 In 2000, the job creation rate in the high-technology sector was approaching 20% year-over-year. Within a decade, the rate had halved to about 10%.176 Although the job creation rate in the high-technology sector has fallen substantially since the early 2000s, the job destruction rate in 2011 was roughly unchanged from 2000.177 As a result, in 2011 the rate of job destruction in the high technology sector was higher than the rate of job creation, a reversal from the year 2000, when the jobcreation rate far outpaced the job-destruction rate.178 In line with this trend, there is mounting evidence that the dominance of online platforms has materially weakened innovation and entrepreneurship in the U.S. economy.179 Some venture capitalists, for example, report that they avoid funding entrepreneurs and other companies that compete directly with dominant firms in the digital economy.180

#### 742 markets disprove

Koski et al., 20 (Heli Koski, Otto Kässi, and Fabian Braesemann, Koski is a Research Director at Etla Economic Research and a Research Director at Aalto University, Kässi is a Researcher at Etla EconomicResearch., Braesemann is a Research fellow andData Scientist at Oxford University’s Saïd Business School., 1-7-2020, accessed on 8-20-2021, Etla , "Killers on the Road of Emerging Start-ups – Implications for Market Entry and Venture Capital Financing", https://www.etla.fi/en/publications/killers-on-the-road-of-emerging-start-ups-implications-for-market-entry-and-venture-capital-financing/)//Babcii

5. Conclusions We studied the effects of acquisitions made by the large US-based technology companies on the entry dynamics and venture capital financing in different product markets. We used **data from 742 product markets globally**, distinguishing the US and European markets for the years 2003-2018. Our estimation results suggest that the technology giants' buyouts subsequently reduced market entry rates and decreased available venture capital funding in the target product markets of tech giants' acquisitions. In other words, the acquisitions of data giants seem to generate the so-called kill zone effect. Our empirical analysis further suggests that the kill zone effect was strengthened during the 2010s when large technology companies gained increasing access to user data. Furthermore, we find that technology giants' acquisitions of platform companies have decreased market entry in non-platform markets.

## Adv---Europe

## Off

### 2AC --- T --- F/L

#### We meet ---

#### a. The standards only target a few companies but are industry wide

Caruso, 21 (Jay Caruso, Jay Caruso is managing editor of the Washington Examiner magazine. He was previously an editorial writer and editorial board member with the Dallas Morning News. His work has also appeared in National Review, the Atlantic, and the Daily Beast., 6-18-2021, accessed on 8-13-2021, Washington Examiner, "The Ending Platform Monopolies Act targets Big Tech", https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/business/the-ending-platform-monopolies-act-targets-big-tech)//Babcii

The legislation has a narrow focus, centered on companies with market capitalizations of more than $600 billion and that have more than 50 million active monthly users or 100,000 or more monthly active business users. That raises possible legal questions because **only a select few companies fall into that category. However**, Wayne T. Brough, the policy director for technology and innovation at the R Street Institute, a public policy research organization, is skeptical of a legal challenge. "It was written in a way that a covered platform targets the Big Tech companies while letting other large online platforms such as Walmart off the hook," Brough said in an email to the Washington Examiner. "But technically, **the standards are industry-wide standards**, so I don't know if a legal challenge would be possible."

#### b. It could affect any company

**Dawson, 21** (Chris Dawson, co-editor of Tamebay, 6-13-2021, accessed on 8-27-2021, Tamebay, "US Ending Platform Monopolies Act Amazon killing draft bill", https://tamebay.com/2021/06/us-ending-platform-monopolies-act-amazon-killing-draft-bill.html)//Babcii

With five bills including The Ending Platform Monopolies Act all aimed largely at Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google, there is an underlying problem. This is legislation targeted at specific companies and so the criteria that decides whether a bill applies to you or not has been drawn up to make sure they are impacted. This is not a set of bills aimed at general fairness across industry and for that reason means that after causing the break up of the four big tech companies **the next business it impacts** may have highly undesirable impact. As an example, the bills aren’t aimed at Walmart but Walmart has a marketplace. If Walmart grew their marketplace to 50 million US users and the company value grew to $600 billion, then Walmart would suddenly be banned from selling their own food on their marketplace!

### 2AC --- Adv CP --- F/L

#### R&D efforts make concentrated monopoly power exponentially worse

Lambert 18 (Thomas Lambert, University of Louisville, 10/13/18, MPRA, "Monopoly Capital and Innovation: An Exploratory Assessment of RD Effectiveness", https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89503/1/MPRA\_paper\_89503.pdf)

The results of the models displayed in the preliminary analysis by this paper mostly support the monopoly capital point of view that R&D expenditures and efforts are not that effective, and although not addressed by the monopoly capital school of thought, perhaps R&D efforts are also destructive when it comes to net business investment, small business formation, job creation, and promoting competition. Outside of boosting productivity, the only other items on which R&D efforts have a positive impact is on corporate share prices (S&P Index) and corporate profits, which are to be expected if a firm has a viable research program and the more difficult it is to replicate a firm’s innovations due to patenting, according to mainstream economic theory (Pakes 1985, Cockburn and Griliches 1988). Innovation is linked to increases in productivity, a claim touted and supported by neoclassical economics, but the increases in productivity could be benefitting existing and larger firms at the expense of newer and smaller 16 The US Internal Revenue Service only has detailed data on tax credits by industry and business size mostly going back to 2001, although some data goes back to 1990. 16 ones,17 and so the closure rates of existing firms could be shrinking for this reason as the number of new smaller firms and new market entrants keep declining, although the exit rates for existing smaller firms has declined. Most of all, as R&D efforts have increased, the exit rates of larger firms have declined as the portion of firms with 500 or more employees has increased. Table 3 shows R&D efforts to be positively and significantly associated with the portion of firms of large size. This in turn may be causing a decline in competition in many markets. Finally, with fewer new firms entering markets, this could explain a decline in net business investment over time, especially if the number of most existing firms has increased over time, as indicated by Table 3, and these firms are not using all of their capacity. Part of net business investment comes from new businesses opening. Such a situation could also partially explain a slowdown in new job creation. All of these trends, in turn, points to possible causes of current and future stagnation in the US economy thanks to declining competition, increasing market concentration, less job creation (although perhaps greater job stability for those who work in larger firms), less net business investment, and greater worker productivity which, in a contradictory way, can minimize the need for more workers and at the same time yields greater profits for large corporations. The rise in profits with fewer new investment outlets thanks to fewer new businesses, in turn, exacerbates the problem of surplus absorption. Such are the contradictions of a monopoly capital system.

#### No possible way it solves China

Christopher Darby and Sarah Sewall, 2021, “The Innovation Wars” Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr2021, Vol. 100 Issue 2, p142-153. Accessed 7-21-2021. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars]/mnw

Over time, the U.S. government lost its lead in innovation. Increasingly, the most innovative R & D was taking place not in the labs of large corporations but at nimbler, privately funded startups, where venture capital investors were willing to tolerate more risk. Modern venture capital firms-partnerships that invest in early-stage companies-first arose in the 1970s, leading to early successes such as Apple and Microsoft, but it wasn't until the dot-com bubble of the 1990s that this style of investment really took off. If the first phase of R & D outsourcing was from government labs to corporate America, this was the second phase: away from big businesses and toward small startups. Large companies began to spend less on internal R & D and more on what they called "corporate development," or acquiring smaller, venture-backed companies with promising technologies. The rise of venture capitalism created a great deal of wealth, but it didn't necessarily further U.S. interests. Venture capital firms were judged by their ability to generate outsize returns within a ten-year window. That made them less interested in things such as microelectronics, a capital-intensive sector where profitability arrives in decades more so than years, and more interested in software companies, which need less capital to get going. The problem is that the companies receiving the most venture capital funding have been less likely to pursue national security priorities.

#### The WTO is useless

**Hesse 18** (Martin Hesse; Reporter for Spiegal Online; [http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/world-trade-organization-in-trouble-amid-trump-trade-war-a-1215802.html#](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/world-trade-organization-in-trouble-amid-trump-trade-war-a-1215802.html); 7-30-18)

The U.S. and other industrialized nations made several concessions to developing economies when the WTO was founded in 1995 and significantly reduced their tariffs. In return, they were able to push through stronger protections for intellectual property. They hoped that the strategy would help slow China's rise. But from the U.S. perspective, the system has not been beneficial. And once China joined the WTO in 2001, that dissatisfaction only grew, partly because the Chinese proved adept at taking advantage of the rules. Even today, there is significant dissent within the WTO because the economic superpower China is still classified as a "developing nation" by the organization, which gives it certain privileges. On the other hand, China is fighting for recognition as a market economy, to which both the U.S. and the European Union are opposed because it would mean they could no longer defend themselves against state-subsidized Chinese exports with anti-dumping duties. On top of all that, the WTO is facing a more fundamental problem: its size and its sluggishness. Negotiating rounds focused on removing tariffs have become increasingly complex. And because everything is up for negotiation at the same time, every member state can paralyze the process by simply exercising its veto. The Doha Round, launched in 2001, is a perfect example: **It never achieved any results and has become symbolic of the WTO's failure.**

### 2AC --- EU CP --- F/L

#### a. They can’t --- lack of remedial options locks in rather than combat dominance

**Young, 21** (Ryan Young, Young is a Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI). M.A. in economics from George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, and a B.A. in history from Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin. , 2-5-2021, accessed on 9-11-2021, Competitive Enterprise Institute, "Proposed European Tech Regulations Will Backfire, Badly - Competitive Enterprise Institute", https://cei.org/blog/proposed-european-tech-regulations-will-backfire-badly/)

Finally, DSA/DMA wouldn’t actually take down the big American companies, but lock in their dominance. They can afford massive fines and compliance costs; smaller startups can’t. And if a smaller competitor nears the threshold of becoming a “gatekeeper,” it may decide to stay small on purpose, leaving most of the market to big incumbents. This would harm consumers, who would pay more to have fewer choices and lower-quality services.

#### b. Can’t garner enough support for breakups that’s Dorpe AND

**Rivero, 20** (Nicolás Rivero, 12-21-2020, accessed on 8-17-2021, Quartz, "Will governments break up tech giants like Google or Amazon in 2021?", https://qz.com/1946579/will-governments-break-up-tech-giants-like-google-or-amazon-in-2021/)//Babcii

If any court is going to dismember US-based tech giants like Facebook, it’ll have to be an American one. While European prosecutors have led the world in bringing antitrust cases against Big Tech companies, they’ve been extremely reluctant to pursue breakups. Margrethe Vestager, the EU’s competition czar, said in December that restructuring companies is a “nuclear option” of last resort.

### 2AC --- EU DA --- F/L

#### 4. No impact to inequality.

Liddiard 19 (Patrick Liddiard has served as a political analyst in the US Government. His research focuses on democratic institutions, democratization and political instability.; “Is Populism Really a Problem for Democracy?” Wilson Center; August 2019; <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/populism-really-problem-for-democracy>) Accessed 6/25/21//eleanor

The emergence of populist parties, of course, does not lead deterministically to democratic breakdowns. Party system change and the electoral success of new political actors have historically reflected political entrepreneurs mobilizing new constituencies that had previously lacked representation, and most populist parties that do gain control of government will govern without democracy collapsing. Populist parties can also moderate their anti-establishment stances while in office, particularly if party leadership has previous political experience. For example, Greece’s left-wing populist SYRIZA party, once in power, toned down its polarizing rhetoric and moderated its policies as it was confronted with domestic and international political and economic constraints. lxiii SYRIZA’s Alexis Tsipras came to the premiership with considerable experience in the workings of large political organizations, having held various leadership positions in leftist political parties for 20 years beforehand.

#### 5. No failed states impact

Patrick, IR PhD, 11, IR PhD @ Oxford, senior fellow, director – program on international institutions and global governance @ Council on Foreign Relations, 4/15/’11 (Stewart M, “Why Failed States Shouldn’t Be Our Biggest National Security Fear,” <http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/why-failed-states-shouldnt-our-biggest-national-security-fear/p24689>)

In truth, while failed states may be worthy of America's attention on humanitarian and development grounds, most of them are irrelevant to U.S. national security. The risks they pose are mainly to their own inhabitants. Sweeping claims to the contrary are not only inaccurate but distracting and unhelpful, providing little guidance to policymakers seeking to prioritize scarce attention and resources.¶ In 2008, I collaborated with Brookings Institution senior fellow Susan E. Rice, now President Obama's permanent representative to the United Nations, on an index of state weakness in developing countries. The study ranked all 141 developing nations on 20 indicators of state strength, such as the government's ability to provide basic services. More recently, I've examined whether these rankings reveal anything about each nation's role in major global threats: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international crime and infectious disease.¶ The findings are startlingly clear. Only a handful of the world's failed states pose security concerns to the United States. Far greater dangers emerge from stronger developing countries that may suffer from corruption and lack of government accountability but come nowhere near qualifying as failed states.¶ The link between failed states and transnational terrorism, for instance, is tenuous. Al-Qaeda franchises are concentrated in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia but are markedly absent in most failed states, including in sub-Saharan Africa. Why? From a terrorist's perspective, the notion of finding haven in a failed state is an oxymoron. Al-Qaeda discovered this in the 1990s when seeking a foothold in anarchic Somalia. In intercepted cables, operatives bemoaned the insuperable difficulties of working under chaos, given their need for security and for access to the global financial and communications infrastructure. Al-Qaeda has generally found it easier to maneuver in corrupt but functional states, such as Kenya, where sovereignty provides some protection from outside interdiction.¶ Pakistan and Yemen became sanctuaries for terrorism not only because they are weak but because their governments lack the will to launch sustained counterterrorism operations against militants whom they value for other purposes. Terrorists also need support from local power brokers and populations. Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al-Qaeda finds succor in the Pashtun code of pashtunwali, which requires hospitality to strangers, and in the severe brand of Sunni Islam practiced locally. Likewise in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has found sympathetic tribal hosts who have long welcomed mujaheddin back from jihadist struggles.¶ Al-Qaeda has met less success in northern Africa's Sahel region, where a moderate, Sufi version of Islam dominates. But as the organization evolves from a centrally directed network to a diffuse movement with autonomous cells in dozens of countries, it is as likely to find haven in the banlieues of Paris or high-rises of Minneapolis as in remote Pakistani valleys.¶ What about failed states and weapons of mass destruction? Many U.S. analysts worry that poorly governed countries will pursue nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons; be unable to control existing weapons; or decide to share WMD materials.¶ These fears are misplaced. With two notable exceptions — North Korea and Pakistan — the world's weakest states pose minimal proliferation risks, since they have limited stocks of fissile or other WMD material and are unlikely to pursue them. Far more threatening are capable countries (say, Iran and Syria) intent on pursuing WMD, corrupt nations (such as Russia) that possess loosely secured nuclear arsenals and poorly policed nations (try Georgia) through which proliferators can smuggle illicit materials or weapons.¶ When it comes to crime, the story is more complex. Failed states do dominate production of some narcotics: Afghanistan cultivates the lion's share of global opium, and war-torn Colombia rules coca production. The tiny African failed state of Guinea-Bissau has become a transshipment point for cocaine bound for Europe. (At one point, the contraband transiting through the country each month was equal to the nation's gross domestic product.) And Somalia, of course, has seen an explosion of maritime piracy. Yet failed states have little or no connection with other categories of transnational crime, from human trafficking to money laundering, intellectual property theft, cyber-crime or counterfeiting of manufactured goods.¶ Criminal networks typically prefer operating in functional countries that provide baseline political order as well as opportunities to corrupt authorities. They also accept higher risks to work in nations straddling major commercial routes. Thus narco-trafficking has exploded in Mexico, which has far stronger institutions than many developing nations but borders the United States. South Africa presents its own advantages. It is a country where “the first and the developing worlds exist side by side,” author Misha Glenny writes. “The first world provides good roads, 728 airports . . . the largest cargo port in Africa, and an efficient banking system. . . . The developing world accounts for the low tax revenue, overstretched social services, high levels of corruption throughout the administration, and 7,600 kilometers of land and sea borders that have more holes than a second-hand dartboard.” Weak and failing African states, such as Niger, simply cannot compete.

### 2AC --- Econ --- F/L

#### a. Section 5 of the FTC act

Ferris et al., 21 (Jamilla Ferris, Lydia Parnes, and Lindsey Edwards, Jamillia has held leadership positions and oversaw mergers at both the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FCC., Co-leader of the privacy and cybersecurity practice, Lydia advises companies on privacy and data protection law compliance and represents them in complex regulatory investigations., Lindsey Edwards is an associate in the Washington, D.C., office of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, where she is a member of the firm's antitrust practice. Her work encompasses a variety of civil and criminal antitrust matters, including litigation, government investigations, and mergers and acquisitions., 7-6-2021, accessed on 8-27-2021, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati Professional Corporation Home Page - Palo Alto, Silicon Valley, San Francisco, New York, Seattle, San Diego, Washington, D.C., Shanghai, Hong Kong, Brussels - Spotlight on Antitrust: FTC Open Meeting Reflects Changing Tide, "Spotlight on Antitrust: FTC Open Meeting Reflects Changing Tide", https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/spotlight-on-antitrust-ftc-open-meeting-reflects-changing-tide.html)

Key Takeaways: The decision to depart from the consumer welfare standard (and possibly the rule of reason) leaves Section 5 without a standard; this will encourage a greater level of FTC intervention in business activity and will require time before businesses can ascertain how to comply with the new rules. FTC staff will now have an expedited ability to carry out compulsory process requests, undoubtedly increasing the number and scope of investigations conducted by the FTC. The Democratic Commissioners stressed that the changes adopted will increase transparency and allow the FTC to be more nimble and responsive in its enforcement, and will allow the FTC to fully live up to its statutory mandate and be a more aggressive enforcer. The Republican Commissioners made repeated arguments that the resolutions went beyond the FTC's statutory mandate, citing AMG Capital Management LLC v. FTC as a recent warning against agency overreach, where the Supreme Court unanimously held that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority under Section 13(b) when seeking disgorgement in federal court. The Republican Commissioners also criticized the lack of notice and public comment, as well as the lack of staff involvement in the lead-up to the meeting. All four votes were decided along partisan lines, with the three Democratic Commissioners voting in favor of all the resolutions and the two Republican Commissioners voting against. This partisan division is likely indicative of what is to come under the Biden FTC as long as the current line-up of Commissioners remains. The public comments at the end of the meeting were largely from participants in various industries, including many from the restaurant, healthcare, and farming industries, calling for more aggressive antitrust and consumer protection enforcement against food delivery services, dominant pharmaceutical companies, dominant technology contractors, predatory franchisors, and grocery suppliers. We can expect that all of these areas will receive some attention in the coming years.

#### b. New York “abuse of dominance”

**Abbott, 21** (Alden Abbott, Abbott is a a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, focusing on antitrust issues. He previously served as the Federal Trade Commission’s General Counsel from 2018 to early 2021., 6-13-2021, accessed on 9-13-2021, Truth on the Market, "NY ‘Abuse of Dominance’ Bill Attacks Consumer Welfare and the US Antitrust Tradition", https://truthonthemarket.com/2021/06/13/ny-abuse-of-dominance-bill-attacks-consumer-welfare-and-the-us-antitrust-tradition/)//Babcii

Unfortunately, the New York State Senate seems to have lost sight of the importance of promoting vigorous competition and consumer welfare, not competitor welfare, as the hallmark of American antitrust jurisprudence. The chamber on June 7 passed the ill-named 21st Century Antitrust Act (TCAA), legislation that, if enacted and signed into law, would seriously undermine consumer welfare and innovation. Let’s take a quick look at the TCAA’s parade of horribles. The TCAA makes it unlawful for any person “with a dominant position in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce, in any labor market, or in the furnishing of any service in this state to abuse that dominant position.” A “dominant position” may be established through “direct evidence” that “may include, but is not limited to, the unilateral power to set prices, terms, power to dictate non-price contractual terms without compensation; or other evidence that a person is not constrained by meaningful competitive pressures, such as the ability to degrade quality without suffering reduction in profitability. In labor markets, direct evidence of a dominant position may include, but is not limited to, the use of non-compete clauses or no-poach agreements, or the unilateral power to set wages.” The “direct evidence” language is unbounded and hopelessly vague. What does it mean to not be “constrained by meaningful competitive pressures”? Such an inherently subjective characterization would give prosecutors carte blanche to find dominance. What’s more, since “no court shall require definition of a relevant market” to find liability in the face of “direct evidence,” multiple competitors in a vigorously competitive market might be found “dominant.” Thus, for example, the ability of a firm to use non-compete clauses or no-poach agreements for efficient reasons (such as protecting against competitor free-riding on investments in human capital or competitor theft of trade secrets) would be undermined, even if it were commonly employed in a market featuring several successful and aggressive rivals. “Indirect evidence” based on market share also may establish a dominant position under the TCAA. Dominance would be presumed if a competitor possessed a market “share of forty percent or greater of a relevant market as a seller” or “thirty percent or greater of a relevant market as a buyer”. Those numbers are far below the market ranges needed to find a “monopoly” under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Moreover, given inevitable error associated with both market definitions and share allocations—which, in any event, may fluctuate substantially—potential arbitrariness would attend share based-dominance calculations. Most significantly, of course, market shares may say very little about actual market power. Where entry barriers are low and substitutes wait in the wings, a temporarily large market share may not bestow any ability on a “dominant” firm to exercise power over price or to exclude competitors. In short, it would be trivially easy for non-monopolists possessing very little, if any, market power to be characterized as “dominant” under the TCAA, based on “direct evidence” or “indirect evidence.” Once dominance is established, what constitutes an abuse of dominance? The TCAA states that an “abuse of a dominant position may include, but is not limited to, conduct that tends to foreclose or limit the ability or incentive of one or more actual or potential competitors to compete, such as leveraging a dominant position in one market to limit competition in a separate market, or refusing to deal with another person with the effect of unnecessarily excluding or handicapping actual or potential competitors.” In addition, “[e]vidence of pro-competitive effects shall not be a defense to abuse of dominance and shall not offset or cure competitive harm.” This language is highly problematic. Effective rivalrous competition by its very nature involves behavior by a firm or firms that may “limit the ability or incentive” of rival firms to compete. For example, a company’s introduction of a new cost-reducing manufacturing process, or of a patented product improvement that far surpasses its rivals’ offerings, is the essence of competition on the merits. Nevertheless, it may limit the ability of its rivals to compete, in violation of the TCAA. Moreover, so-called “monopoly leveraging” typically generates substantial efficiencies, and very seldom undermines competition (see here, for example), suggesting that (at best) leveraging theories would generate enormous false positives in prosecution. The TCAA’s explicit direction that procompetitive effects not be considered in abuse of dominance cases further detracts from principled enforcement; it denigrates competition, the very condition that American antitrust law has long sought to promote. Put simply, under the TCAA, “dominant” firms engaging in normal procompetitive conduct could be held liable (and no doubt frequently would be held liable, given their inability to plead procompetitive justifications) for “abuses of dominance.” To top it off, firms convicted of abusing a dominant position would be liable for treble damages. As such, the TCAA would strongly disincentivize aggressive competitive behavior that raises consumer welfare. The TCAA’s negative ramifications would be far-reaching. By embracing a civil law “abuse of dominance” paradigm, the TCAA would run counter to a longstanding U.S. common law antitrust tradition that largely gives free rein to efficiency-seeking competition on the merits. It would thereby place a new and unprecedented strain on antitrust federalism. In a digital world where the effects of commercial conduct frequently are felt throughout the United States, the TCAA’s attack on efficient welfare-inducing business practices would have national (if not international) repercussions. The TCAA would alter business planning calculations for the worse and could interfere directly in the setting of national antitrust policy through congressional legislation and federal antitrust enforcement initiatives. It would also signal to foreign jurisdictions that the United States’ long-expressed staunch support for reliance on the Consumer Welfare Standard as the touchtone of sound antitrust enforcement is no longer fully operative.

#### 6. Business formation is useless for the general economy

Bagrie, 18 (Cameron Bagrie, Cameron Bagrie is the Managing Director of Bagrie Economics. Cameron has been an economist for 20 years. For over 11 years he was the Chief Economist at ANZ. He has also worked as an economist at the National Bank, Treasury and Statistics New Zealand., 8-9-2018, accessed on 8-21-2021, The Spinoff, "Business confidence is a hopeless indicator. But that doesn’t mean the economy isn’t in trouble", <https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/09-08-2018/business-confidence-is-bullshit-but-that-doesnt-mean-the-economy-isnt-in-trouble/)//Babcii>

The economy is headed for recession if you believe the readings from business confidence. Thankfully we can largely ignore business confidence readings. We can’t ignore other survey measures though that are saying growth has slowed and the official statistics are showing the same. The last three quarterly GDP prints have been 0.6, 0.6 and 0.5% and we only have data up to March 2018. That’s annualised growth in the low 2’s and a dip below 2% now looks likely. We have the potential for a growth pothole. That is becoming a concern as the wheels of the economy need to be turning and tax revenue coming in the door for social agenda demands to be met. A whopping net 45% of firms are pessimistic about the general economy according to the ANZ Business Outlook survey. That’s a level last seen around the global financial crisis. Of course, no one really believes things are that bad. We can’t blame the global scene as other countries would be seeing massive falls in confidence too if that was a key factor. Other countries are not. The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) is showing weak readings for business confidence within their Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO) too. The good news is that business confidence is hopeless as an economic indicator. The correlation with economic growth is poor and I largely ignore business confidence readings. Changes in direction can provide some insightful information – whether things are picking up or slowing down, but not the levels. Businesses tend to be more upbeat regarding general confidence about the economy under a blue flag as opposed to a red one. Business confidence averaged minus 18 between 2000 and 2007. The economy (measured by real gross domestic product) grew on average by more than 3.5% per year. Yep, confidence was negative, but growth was positive. So, we ignore business confidence as an economic indicator. This is nothing new. It’s surprising headline business confidence figures receive so much attention.

### 2AC --- K --- F/L

#### 5. It solves (JCCC Blue)

Lind 20 – Michael Lind is a professor of practice at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and the author of more than a dozen books, December 21st (“Antitrust or Countervailing Power?”, *American Compass*, Available online at <https://americancompass.org/the-commons/antitrust-or-countervailing-power/>, Accessed 05-24-2021)

The alternative to the phony miracle drug of antitrust is the tested and proven remedy of countervailing power. The term was coined by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, but the practice is much older. The idea of countervailing power is simple. If you have concentrated power in one part of the economy, you can either use the crude instrument of antitrust to pulverize it, or you can balance that concentration of power with another concentration of power. The government itself can wield countervailing power, checking unbalanced corporate power directly by means of regulation. But countervailing power can also be exercised by non-governmental entities that pool the power of many smaller entities or great numbers of individuals—entities that include labor unions, purchasing cooperatives, and credit unions. Let’s look at how countervailing power can promote the interests of the four groups we have already discussed: small producers, workers, consumers, and citizens. Small producers. What if, instead of levelling down, we levelled up? What if, instead of tearing down big firms, we allowed small firms to pool their efforts, to enjoy economies of scale by working together in marketing, research, or other areas? The Supreme Court has ruled that small-producer cartels are illegal under U.S. antitrust laws, but most mergers of small firms to form a single large firm are legal. There are exceptions to this rule. One is the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, which exempts certain agricultural cooperatives from antitrust prosecution. Today, the majority of American farmers belong to one or more of the 2000 local farm cooperatives under the umbrella of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC), founded in 1929. In addition to these traditional cooperatives, legislation in 2014 authorized the creation of commodity marketing boards under the U.S. Department of Agriculture which are funded by mandatory assessments on producers of a given commodity and use the funds for research and marketing, including export promotion. Among these are the wonderfully-named Popcorn Board, Christmas Tree Board, Mushroom Council, and Administrative Committee for Pistachios. Similar government-chartered research and marketing boards could be created on behalf of small to medium firms in other sectors like manufacturing and services. But here’s the irony: marketing cooperatives for small producers work because they are exempt from antitrust law. The antimonopolists seek to help small firms indirectly, by breaking up big firms. The real friends of small business for nearly a century have chosen the wiser strategy of helping small firms directly, by carving out exemptions from antitrust law to allow small businesses to combine for certain shared purposes so they can compete with big firms. Workers. The most important kind of countervailing power in a modern industrial society is provided by organized labor. The American labor movement has usually sought to get large firms to share their profits with their workers, not break them up. Samuel Gompers, the founding president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), in a 1907 speech entitled “Labor and Its Attitude Toward the Trusts,” declared of modern large corporations: With their advent and development the day of individual workman and individual employer passed, never to return…Organized labor has less difficulty in dealing with large firms and corporations today than with many individual employers or small firms. Consumers. It is possible, to be sure, that some firms will use monopoly or oligopoly market power to gouge consumers or small businesses. One remedy short of direct government regulation is to encourage the formation of consumer purchasing cooperatives, which can pool the buying power of their members, whether individuals or firms, in order to bargain for discounts. Variations of countervailing power on the side of consumers include member-owned grocery stores and member-owned credit unions. Citizens. When all other forms of countervailing power have been tried and have failed to check predatory pricing of goods, services, lending or wages, government can step in and regulate prices or wages directly on behalf of the citizenry. In health care, for example, every advanced nation except the U.S. negotiates standard “all-payer” fee schedules with physicians’ associations, hospital associations and pharma companies. Public utility grids are natural geographic monopolies, so local governments regulate the rates they can charge, even if they are privately owned. The federal minimum wage provides a floor for wages. But direct regulation of prices or wages by government should be the last resort. While the crude version of academic Econ 101 found in the brains of most policymakers and pundits holds that prices and wages can be set only by market competition or government, in the real world prices and wages are often set by a third method: negotiation among buyers and sellers. If markets are uncompetitive, or if they are competitive but produce outcomes that are intolerable for society, then before resorting to coercive regulation government should first encourage or establish institutions with countervailing power—small-producer coops that can compete with big firms in sectors characterized by economies of scale, trade unions that can bargain for higher wages and benefits from employers, consumer cooperatives that can bargain down the prices charged by vendors to their members, and credit unions that can offer their members low-cost alternatives to commercial banking products. In an economy based on the checks and balances of countervailing power, there will still be room for antitrust/competition policy at the margins. But the focus of antitrust policy should be on actual predatory behavior, not scale by itself. And while synergies make sense in some sectors, there is no economic justification for conglomerate firms that exist solely to siphon revenues from incoherent assemblages of companies in unrelated industries. Countervailing power, yes; antitrust, maybe. Rather than dismember the giants, government as a rule should help the Lilliputians to join forces.

#### 7. Growth is sustainable because of the shift to a knowledge economy---AND making it faster is key to outrun entropy---extinction

Gennady Shkliarevsky 18, professor of history at Bard College where he has taught since 1985, 1-5-2018, "Tax Cuts and the Problem of Economic Growth," International Policy Digest, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/01/05/tax-cuts-and-the-problem-of-economic-growth/

Does this problem have a solution? Is it possible for humanity to break out of the current vicious circle and achieve a constant, stable, sustained, or even exponentially increasing economic progress? Production and consumption are the two most important categories in our economy and economic thinking. They constrain each other and this mutual constraint acts as a limitation on the rate of our economic growth. The typical effect of the expansion of production is the increase in supply. Supply growth results in declining prices. The decline in prices signals that the market is saturated and production must slow down. When production slows down, supply diminishes and prices begin to grow, which triggers a new expansion of production. When production expands, our wealth grows and economy appreciates. Consumption generally depreciates products and thus our wealth declines and our economy depreciates. Thus, production and consumption constrain each other and this constraint limits the rate of our economic growth. In order to solve this problem and achieve constant growth, we need to constantly rejuvenate our economy, we need to ensure a sustained supply of new products to the market and, moreover, we need to make sure that these products are needed. The main economic problem we face today is precisely in bringing novelties to the marketplace. Many business people, economists, pundits and politicians have stressed that we will have to innovate our way out of the current economic predicament. Therefore, creativity and creation are the key to solving the problem of growth. However, creativity, or what we call entrepreneurship when we talk about economy, is not a science. We cannot use it in any predictable way. It is a very uncertain and contingent factor that is fraught with many unknowns and surprises. Therefore, the problem of economic growth is reformulated into the problem of how to make innovation constant, predictable, and steady, rather than sporadic and contingent. In other words, how can we control our creativity? As has already been pointed out, consumption acts as a constraint on production. Production appreciates and consumption depreciates. The tendency of consumption to depreciate our economy is the reason for the existence of limits to rates of economic growth. As one can see, production and consumption are two most essential economic functions. They are mutually dependent, complementary and cannot exist without each other. The problem for achieving constant and sustained growth is that their vectors point in different directions: one toward appreciation and the other toward depreciation. However, do they have to be opposed to each other? There are two kinds of consumption that we know. One kind of consumption is consumption of final products. Indeed, this kind of consumption always depreciates products. You drive your new car out of the parking lot and it immediately loses value. But this form of consumption is not the only one we know. There is also a form of consumption that appreciates products, for example, consumption of raw materials or semi-finished products. Another interesting case of consumption that appreciates is the consumption of technological devices and machines. Indeed, physical use of such devices and machines depreciates them. However, they also represent certain technological knowledge. Knowledge consumption involves our mind. Mental consumption inevitably involves mediation and, therefore, construction that takes place in our mind. In other words, in order to consume something our mind has to create forms of mediation that allow us to consume this something, or, in other words, we have to produce it in our mind. Our sense organs transmit to our brain electrical signals that the brain interprets. We produce reality and production necessarily involves appreciation. Thus mental consumption involves necessarily the creation of new knowledge and hence appreciation. The above argument bears one important conclusion that consumption does not necessarily involve depreciation. Consumption can also, like production, be associated with appreciation, particularly consumption that involves mental activity that is associated with production of knowledge, or creation. We live in the era of knowledge society when knowledge is the main means of production and the principal product. The share of knowledge production by comparison with the production of consumer goods is constantly growing and already begins to outstrip the latter. Since consumption of knowledge, just like its production, is associated with appreciation, the transition to knowledge society suggests that in the modern economy both consumption and production will lead to appreciation and increase in wealth. They do not stand opposed to each other and their balance does not slow down the economy but is the source of its appreciation and constant growth. Balance in this case means that when production grows, so does consumption and both contribute to appreciation of the economy and economic growth. The constraint on the rates of growth disappears and the pace of economic growth can accelerate. The combined effect of growth that comes from production and consumption is double from what it is in our current economy. In other words, economic growth becomes exponential and limitless: as production increases, so does consumption, and more consumption leads to greater appreciation and greater wealth. This infinite and exponential economic growth is not only possible, but is, in fact, essential. Without such growth our civilization simply cannot exist. Our civilization is essentially a dissipative system that constantly generates entropy. As soon as this system ceases to create new levels and forms of organization, it begins to deplete available resources. The only way it can sustain itself indefinitely is by constantly redefining itself in ways that allow us to capture new flows of energy and resources; and where there are new flows of energy and resources, work can be performed. It is our destiny to play this catch-up game, and the only way we can play it indefinitely is by constantly creating new levels and forms of organization of reality so as to maintain the overall entropy level at zero. There is no way for our civilization to go back to less powerful levels of organization of social production, as advocated by the adepts of de-growth, or even to maintain the same level of production organization (steady-state economy). Limits to growth or de-growth are not ultimately realistic possibilities. Our civilization can only move forward. If we decide to terminate the progress of our civilization, we will embark on the path that leads only to its eventual disintegration and disappearance—an option that even supporters of limits to growth or de-growth do not want to entertain.

#### Aff does

Lierop, 20 (Wal van Lierop, venture capitalist, corporate executive, international consultant and university professor, 10-9-2020, accessed on 8-21-2021, Forbes, "Step Up Or Break Up: The Challenge For Big Tech", <https://www.forbes.com/sites/walvanlierop/2020/10/09/step-up-or-break-up-the-challenge-for-big-tech/?sh=7b11834d2016)//Babcii>

In truth, these exuberant investments in the Big Five have created extremely risky dynamics—for the functionality of free markets, the health of civic society and the future of innovation. These once rebellious, disruptive companies have become behemoths that jealously guard their power and the status quo. Their alleged innovation “ecosystem” resembles a hunting preserve where they, the hunters, control which startups live or die. Far too many become meals and trophies. Had the Big Five grown phenomenally while playing by fair rules, it would be much harder to criticize their success. Yet mounting evidence suggests that the Big Five maintain their dominance thanks to insufficient regulation, anticompetitive behavior and business models that manipulate users. Meanwhile, they have driven up the cost of capital for innovations that combat climate change while also luring away key talent.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction

Sebastian **Farquhar 17** leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

# 1AR

## A1

#### Resource arguments are wrong

Perriello, 19 (Tom Perriello, formerly represented Virginia’s 5th District in the U.S. House, is executive director of Open Society-U.S. at the Open Society Foundations., 6-17-2019, accessed on 8-19-2021, The Hill, "Don't worry about China when breaking up Facebook", <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/448834-dont-worry-about-china-when-breaking-up-facebook)//Babcii>

“This is a classic straw man argument,” says Facebook co-founder Chris Hughes. “Breaking up Facebook would not hamstring its ability to compete, or allow China to walk all over us. In fact, a more level playing field would drive new and innovative investment. A post-breakup Facebook would still be massively profitable, with plenty of resources to make such investments. And the federal government could respond to any Chinese intervention using the same tools of trade, tariffs and incentives it has used on other fronts.” Similarly, while it is true that artificial intelligence relies on vast amounts of data and computing power, Big Tech firms that have been broken up would still have plenty of both. In Facebook’s case, hundreds of millions of Americans use Facebook’s core product, Facebook.com, and even in a break-up scenario, it would be worth hundreds of billions of dollars. (Indeed, many see this as a weakness in the break-up arguments.) Facebook’s revenues alone would still be in the tens of billions of dollars, making it one of the largest companies in the world and giving it more than enough resources to power AI research. From a civil society perspective, it’s concerning that even a post-breakup Facebook would still be a dominant force in the research and development of AI. But the argument that breaking up the company would dramatically impair its impact on AI doesn’t hold water.

## Cap K

#### a. Growth solves war – data

Lin 17 [Oon Yong; 4/23/2017; International Economics at SUNY Buffalo, under the supervision of Dr. Sandeep Bhakshar, PhD in economics; “Conflict and Trade,” http://geoeconomics.net/2017/09/13/conflict-and-trade/]

CONFLICT AND TRADE TODAY In the post-cold war era, actual conflicts are relatively few and far between especially between developed nations due to advances in military hardware [nuclear options]. Conflicts took on other forms such as economic warfare and proxy wars. Fortunately, advances in military technology were met with advances in international relations which led to the founding of intergovernmental organizations in the 20th-century. Trade in the modern context can be examined through globalization which serves as an all-encompassing word that represented progress, cultural exchange and increased trade. Development took off in the 1980s to 1990s, most notably from 1990 to 1996, capital inflows to developing countries increased by a massive 600% (Stiglitz, 2006). The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995, absorbing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the organization enabled countries to have a combined platform to address international trade issues which developed and developing countries would both benefit in a world that was accelerating quickly in terms of trade. China’s control of rare earth mineral exports in the global market and the usefulness of the WTO is an example worth observing. China has an effective 97% control of the rare-earth elements market (Müller, Schweizer, & Seiler, 2016). It posed an issue as the Chinese government applied export quotas, causing global firms that use these minerals to be fearful of a supply issue due to the concentration of the source. Rare earth metals were useful in many applications and that contributed to the concern, United States firms used them for several product developments ranging from technological turbines to lab purposes such as for their magnetic properties. In 2014, an argument was brought up to the World Trade Organization [WTO] by the European Union, United States, and Japan in 2012 about the control of rare earth exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The timing was nearly 11 years after the accession of China to the WTO, the panel concluded in 2014 that China’s export tariffs on rare earth exports were inconsistent with their WTO obligations. A study conducted by Müller et. al. (2016) begs to differ and found that U.S. firms could have adopted defensive actions such as stockpiling these materials and that export control effects were not overtly damaging after China has joined the World Trade Organization. But it remained apparent that the Chinese government did use its policies to benefit Chinese firms at the expense of non-domestic companies before they had joined the WTO. On 20 May 2015, China responded to the WTO’s request to conform to its panel’s recommendations and to fulfill its obligations to WTO law. China accepted the panel’s judgment, and the issue was resolved amicably. Bilateral agreements that increase cooperation through trade can also help reduce potential conflict. In 2010, a free trade agreement known as the Economic Framework Cooperation Agreement was initiated between ROC Taiwan and PRC China, details of the agreement were finalized in June 2013. The deal’s results were twofold, firstly Taiwan benefited from the trade potential that China provided. Secondly, the agreement led to reduced pressure by PRC China on ROC Taiwan’s agenda of pursuing free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore (Kan & Morrison, 2013). The change in China’s political stance during that time allowed ROC Taiwan to ink deals in quick succession, initially [ANZTEC] with New Zealand on the 10th of July 2013, and subsequently with Singapore [ASTEP] on 7th November 2013. Bernard Cole of the National War College in Washington, DC shares that the possibility of ROC Taiwan and PRC China conflict has been reduced (Navarro, 2016) and the de-escalation can be partially attributed to the constant flow of trade between both countries. The most revolutionary organization for trade was the formation of the intergovernmental organization known as the European Union [EU]. The EU was founded after World War II [the deadliest war] to prevent future wars. The EU expressed the primary motivation for the formation, “The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to avoid conflict.” (European Union, 2017, para 2). At its founding the EU had six member countries, today it has 28 member countries some of which are fully committed to its economic and monetary union. Furthermore, the EU is at the forefront of democratic thought and champions a broad range of issues such as human rights, internet privacy, and democracy. In support of the idea for the notion of trade and growth bringing peace to society, A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off Professors Chatagnier and Castelli argues that To sustain growth (a basic requirement for every industrialized economy), governments and entrepreneurs must reinvest profits in innovation. Political leaders also benefit, as they can extract more revenue from a richer society. Within industrialized economies, war threatens this virtuous mechanism of investment, innovation, profits, and taxes, rendering it materially unprofitable. (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016) Their argument was based on the assumptions that industrialized economies which have grown to generate additional revenue for society, in general, tends not to prefer wars as it was contrary to the needs of an industrialized economy (Jentleson, 2007). Advocating that an extra dollar spent on military expenditures is one less dollar spent on economic growth for the society. They found that over the last fifty years from 2016, wars were not profitable and that industrialization does indeed reduce a nation’s incentive to enter conflicts due to the economic changes of industrialization. Additionally, the authors recognized that trade between industrialized societies potentially leads to peaceful attitudes (Chatagnier & Castelli, 2016).

### AT: Sustainability

#### COVID induced restructuring that prevents catastrophic future fallouts

Sneader & Singhal 20 [Kevin, degree in law with first-class honors from his hometown University of Glasgow. He went on to graduate from Harvard Business School, where he received a master of business administration degree with highest distinction, and Shubham, leads McKinsey’s healthcare, public sector and social sector work globally. He serves leading healthcare and social institutions and governments on all top-management agenda issues. “Beyond Coronavirus: The Path to the Next Normal” https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Healthcare%20Systems%20and%20Services/Our%20Insights/Beyond%20coronavirus%20The%20path%20to%20the%20next%20normal/Beyond-coronavirus-The-path-to-the-next-normal.ashx]

Reimagination A shock of this scale will create a discontinuous shift in the preferences and expectations of individuals as citizens, as employees, and as consumers. These shifts and their impact on how we live, how we work, and how we use technology will emerge more clearly over the coming weeks and months. Institutions that reinvent themselves to make the most of better insight and foresight, as preferences evolve, will disproportionally succeed. Clearly, the online world of contactless commerce could be bolstered in ways that reshape consumer behavior forever. But other effects could prove even more significant as the pursuit of efficiency gives way to the requirement of resilience—the end of supply-chain globalization, for example, if production and sourcing move closer to the end user. The crisis will reveal not just vulnerabilities but opportunities to improve the performance of businesses. Leaders will need to reconsider which costs are truly fixed versus variable, as the shutting down of huge swaths of production sheds light on what is ultimately required versus nice to have. Decisions about how far to flex operations without loss of efficiency will likewise be informed by the experience of closing down much of global production. Opportunities to push the envelope of technology adoption will be accelerated by rapid learning about what it takes to drive productivity when labor is unavailable. The result: a stronger sense of what makes business more resilient to shocks, more productive, and better able to deliver to customers. Reform The world now has a much sharper definition of what constitutes a black-swan event. This shock will likely give way to a desire to restrict some factors that helped make the coronavirus a global challenge, rather than a local issue to be managed. Governments are likely to feel emboldened and supported by their citizens to take a more active role in shaping economic activity. Business leaders need to anticipate popularly supported changes to policies and regulations as society seeks to avoid, mitigate, and preempt a future health crisis of the kind we are experiencing today. In most economies, a healthcare system little changed since its creation post–World War II will need to determine how to meet such a rapid surge in patient volume, managing seamlessly across in-person and virtual care. Public health approaches, in an interconnected and highly mobile world, must rethink the speed and global coordination with which they need to react. Policies on critical healthcare infrastructure, strategic reserves of key supplies, and contingency production facilities for critical medical equipment will all need to be addressed. Managers of the financial system and the economy, having learned from the economically induced failures of the last global financial crisis, must now contend with strengthening the system to withstand acute and global exogenous shocks, such as this pandemic’s impact. Educational institutions will need to consider modernizing to integrate classroom and distance learning. The list goes on. The aftermath of the pandemic will also provide an opportunity to learn from a plethora of social innovations and experiments, ranging from working from home to large-scale surveillance. With this will come an understanding of which innovations, if adopted permanently, might provide substantial uplift to economic and social welfare— and which would ultimately inhibit the broader betterment of society, even if helpful in halting or limiting the spread of the virus.